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Abstract 
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This paper analyses the potential contribution in terms of crude capabilities that Turkey 
could bring to the European Union’s ESDP security framework. The history of the 
European Union’s security aspirations and the security policy preferences of the major 
actors in European security will also be examined as a way of framing the question of 
Turkey's potential role within the emerging European security and defense framework. 
 
The second chapter will look at how European security has evolved from the 
American-led institutions of the Cold War era to a new post-Cold War dynamic which 
has opened a window of opportunity for European security realignment, development, 
and autonomy. The third chapter, on the security and defense preferences of the US and 
EU members states, makes use of rationalist theory to highlight how national security 
and defense preferences of the individual EU member states shape the ongoing dispute 
within the EU over the ultimate goals of the ESDP. 
 
In the fourth chapter, the paper will examine Turkey's potential contributions to the 
European Union’s ESDP and address Turkey's changing role in European security in 
the post-Cold War era. It posits that, as the EU has begun to develop an independent 
‘hard’ security aspect through the ESDP, the strategic value of Turkish inclusion has 
increased.  
 
In concluding, it argues that, while Turkish incorporation into the ESDP would entail 
new security risks, it would also enhance the Union's military capabilities and role in a 
number of important regions on Europe's periphery. In essence, the inclusion of Turkey 
could make the EU’s bid to become a more involved and independent world actor more 
feasible.  
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Bu tez Türkiye'nin temel imkanlarıyla, Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikasına 
getireceği potansiyel katkıları analiz etmektedir. Türkiye'nin gelecekteki rolünü, 
Avrupa'nın gelişen güvenlik ve savunma anlayışı çerçevesine oturtmak için, Avrupa 
Birliği'nin tarihsel güvenlik endişeleri ve Avrupa güvenliğinde etkin ülkelerin milli 
güvenlik politikaları da incelenmiştir. 
 
İkinci bölüm Soğuk Savaş döneminde ABD önderliğindeki kurumlara bağlı kalan 
Avrupa güvenlik anlayışının, savaş bitimiyle birlikte değişen dinamiklerini ve bunun 
getirdiği yeni olanakları analiz edecektir. ABD ve Avrupa Birliği üye ülkelerinin 
güvenlik ve savunma tercihleri üçüncü bölümde incelenmektedir. AGSP'nin amacının 
tam olarak ne olduğu  konusunda, AB ülkeleri arasında bir mutabakat olmadığından, 
birlik içinde ortaya çıkan bu anlaşmazlığa üye ülkelerin farklı milli güvenlik 
politikalarının sebep olduğu, rasyonalist teori ışığında bu bölümde gösterilecektir. 
 Dördüncü bölüm Soğuk Savaş sonrasında Türkiye'nin Avrupa güvenliğindeki değişen 
rolü üzerinedir ve, AB'nin Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikasıyla birlikte gelişen 
bağımsız “sıkı güvenlik” anlayışı sebebiyle, Türkiye'nin birliğe kabulünün getireceği 
stratejik değerin arttığını ortaya koyacaktır.  
 
Sonuç bölümü ise Türkiye'nin Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikasına dahil 
edilmesinin, yeni güvenlik risklerini beraberinde getirecek olsa bile, birliğin askeri 
gücünü ve Avrupa çevresindeki önemli bölgelerde etkinliğini arttıracağını 
gösterecektir. Özet olarak, Türkiye'nin katılımı AB'nin daha etkili ve bağımsız bir 
dünya oyuncusu olma yolundaki hedefine güç katacaktır. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
  
 Turkey's relations with the European Union have been complicated for almost 
as long as the Union, and the European Community before it, has been in existence. As 
Turkey's current rather dubious distinction of having the longest associational 
agreement (since 1963) with the EU of any candidate country in its history illustrates, 
there is a good bit of uncertainty within the Union as to what to do with Turkey. 
Unfortunately for the Turks, the issue of Turkish membership in the EU cuts to the core 
of a number of other questions regarding the future and scope of the Union that the EU 
has put off dealing with for years. If Turkey, with the vast majority of its landmass in 
Asia, can be considered as a candidate for the EU, the argument goes, where will the 
boundaries of Europe eventually be drawn? As The Economist points out, “It is hard to 
answer that question without deciding what the ultimate purpose of the EU is. But here 
there is no consensus: the habit of the EU has been to invent itself as it goes along.”1 As 
the recent EU Constitutional referendum debacle pointed out, the Union is presently 
undergoing something of a crise d'identité, trying to determine whether its future will 
be as a deeply integrated and geopolitically active European superpower or as a larger 
but looser union primarily concerned with economic integration. The question of 
Turkish EU membership has proved to be so controversial because it strikes directly at 
the heart of this ongoing and, as of yet, unresolved debate within the EU.  
 While Turkey's place in Europe during the Cold War years was established on 
the basis of its participation in European security and defense via its membership in 
NATO, it has found itself as something of an outsider following the post-Cold War 
European security realignment and restructuring. As Müftüler-Baç writes, following the 
end of the Cold War, “with the reduction of the level of military threat, Turkey was no 
longer recognized as European.”2 Unlike its European NATO allies, Turkey was one of 
the few states that found itself still in a largely unstable region at the end of the Cold 
War, and the country had to retain a tight focus on traditional 'hard' security. The EU, 
on the other hand, had the luxury of regional peace and stability and could afford to 
pursue integration, enlargement, and the process of developing itself as an new, 'soft,' 
'civilian power.'  
 The EU's new focus on tools of 'soft power,' such as governance, cooperative 
regional forums, and enlargement, was a source of further divergence from the 'hard 
                                                 
1The Economist, “Turkey belongs in Europe,” 12/7/2002, Vol.365,Issue 8302, p.13. 
2Meltem  Müftüler-Baç, “Turkey's Roles in the EU's Security and Foreign Policies,” Security Dialogue, 
2000, Vol.31(4), p.489.  
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security' focus of its erstwhile ally Turkey. As an article from the New Defense Agenda 
points out, in the post-Cold War era, “for a significant number of EU-15 members, war 
is becoming an unacceptable tool of international relations.”3 However, in recent years, 
as the EU seeks to develop the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) concept 
and bridge the gap between its role as an economic 'giant' and a political 'dwarf,'4  the 
EU has been increasingly comfortable developing a more traditional 'hard' security 
aspect to its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). However, although the EU 
has built up much of the institutional basis of the ESDP, it has been as of yet  unwilling 
to take on the substantial financial resources necessary to bring its capabilities in line 
with its rhetoric. In light of this, Turkey's potential strategic contribution to the ESDP 
has become apparent.  
 As the EU has begun to take note of more recently, Turkey has important 
security assets in its geostrategic position and military capabilities, which could make a 
substantial contribution to the EU in its bid to play a larger international role in security 
and defense. The main arguments for Turkey's inclusion in the ESDP are four-fold: its 
long history as a contributor to European security during the Cold War; its geostrategic 
position as a Eurasian transregional actor bordering on the Balkans, Caucasus, 
Mediterranean, Middle East, and Caspian region; its contribution to tackling the EU's 
security goals as set out in the European Security Strategy (ESS); and its significant 
military capabilities. Turkey is a major regional power located in the midst of the 
region where the EU sees itself playing a more prominent security role. Furthermore, 
the Turkish military, Europe's largest, has significant experience in the sort of long-
term, low intensity operations that the EU envisions in its Petersberg tasks.  
 Although Turkey could potentially play an important role in the EU's emerging 
bid to take on a greater role in regional and global security through the ESDP, the 
inclusion of Turkey could also entail serious new risks and challenges which must also 
be considered. With the addition of Turkey, the EU's security sphere would be extended 
to tense and unstable areas. In the Middle East, Turkey has uneasy relations with its 
Arab neighbors (Iran, Iraq, Syria), which could flare up over issues ranging from the 
Kurdish question to water rights. The Caucasus have been a serious source of 
instability in  the post-Cold War period (e.g., Nagoro-Karabakh, Chechneya, and 
Abkhazia) and involvement in the region could potentially bring the EU into conflict 
                                                 
3Tomas Valasek, “The 'Easternization' of ESDP after EU Enlargement,” Fresh Perspectives on Europe's 
Security, The New Defense Agenda, Winter 2004, p.54. 
4Esra Çayhan, “Turkey and the European Security and Defense Policy,” Turkey and the EU: Domestic 
Politics, Economic Integration, and International Dynamics, (London: Frank Cass, 2003), p.35. 
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with Russia.  Furthermore, while large in size, the Turkish military is built on a 
somewhat outmoded model of conscription and may not possess the training in peace-
making and crisis management necessary to contribute effectively in EU-led Petersberg 
task missions. Turkey also has lingering security disputes with two EU member states, 
Greece and Cyprus, which may prove problematic for the EU as it strives to maintain 
an internally coherent security and foreign policy. Finally, Turkish inclusion may run 
the risk of simply exporting some of Turkey's domestic security problems (Kurdish 
question, drugs and people smuggling, etc) into the EU itself. These risks must be 
carefully considered when assessing the potential contribution of Turkey to European 
security and defense, as they are certainly not insignificant.  
 It is also worth noting here that there are a number of other reasons outside of 
the realm of security which would limit the desirability of Turkish inclusion in the 
European Union. The major arguments in this vein include Turkey's relative economic 
underdevelopment, its vast population (and corresponding potential voting share in the 
EU), the possibility of widespread Turkish immigration to the rest of Europe, its 
insufficient appreciation of European standards for human rights, as well as a host of 
other cultural, historical, and religious 'Turkey is different/foreign' explanations. While 
these are outside of the scope of this paper, with its focus on Turkey's potential security 
contributions to the EU and the ESDP, these arguments are, nonetheless, worth noting, 
as they play an important role in the overall assessment of Turkish membership for 
many in Europe.      
 This essay seeks mainly to address this one important question: what would be 
the potential impact of Turkish accession on the European Union’s ESDP. While the 
analysis of cost and benefits of Turkey's inclusion as a member in the EU is clearly a 
complex and multifaceted question, this paper will only attempt to explain the security 
aspect of this overall dynamic in terms of the ESDP itself, with a particular focus on 
Turkey’s contribution to the EU’s crude power capabilities. As Turkey's inclusion in 
the European order and its perceived 'European' identity largely came about on the 
basis of its membership in NATO and contribution to European security during the 
Cold War, the issue of security is a crucial one for understanding Turkey's evolving 
relationship with the EU.   
 Moreover, it is also important to note that the EU is a multifaceted actor in the 
security arena, with a particular emphasis on ‘soft’ security issues. The EU has taken 
on a foreign and security policy, through its CFSP, that had increasingly made it 
something of a different foreign policy actor when compared to more a traditional state, 
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and particularly so when compared to the hegemonic role of the US in the current 
world system. Given the overwhelming superiority of the US in terms of both ‘hard’ 
security capabilities and the political willingness to sustain and use them, the EU has 
focused its energies on ‘soft’ security. This bifurcation in security orientation within the 
transatlantic relationship has also complicated the US-EU security relationship. This 
increasing divergence in security orientation, while significant, is, however, not the 
focus of this work, which will instead stress the potential impact of Turkey’s inclusion 
on the ESDP in terms of more strict ‘hard’ security capabilities. While the distinction 
between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ security is an increasingly important one, and it is difficult to 
truly separate the two often interlinked concepts, this paper will instead focus more on 
crude capacities.   
 The following three chapters will seek to establish the development of the EU's 
security aspirations and the security and defense preferences of the various EU member 
states, as well as those of the US, as a way of framing the question of Turkey's potential 
role within the emerging European security and defense framework. The second 
chapter, which covers the history of the European Union's security aspirations, will take 
a look at how European security has evolved from the American-led institutions of the 
Cold War era to a new post-Cold War dynamic which has opened a window of 
opportunity for European security realignment, development, and increasing autonomy. 
The third chapter, on the security and defense preferences of the US and EU members 
states, makes use of rationalist theory to highlight how national security and defense 
preferences of the individual EU member states shape the ongoing dispute within the 
EU over the ultimate goals of the ESDP.  
 The fourth chapter, on Turkey's potential contributions to European security and 
defense, covers Turkey's involvement in European security through its Cold War role 
with NATO, as well as how changes in the post-Cold War order have dramatically 
altered Turkey's relationship to Europe in the areas of security and defense. As it is 
only by understanding how European security has developed over the last fifty years 
and how the different EU actors perceived the ultimate aims of that development that 
the Turkish contribution to the EU's ESDP project can be properly evaluated, the fourth 
chapter will also make use of the context established in the previous two chapters to 
examine the benefits and costs of Turkish inclusion within the European security 
framework. The paper will then conclude in a final section by recapping the previous 
chapters and making some final remarks about Turkey and the EU's ESDP. 
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CHAPTER 2: HISTORY OF THE EU’S SECURITY ASPIRATIONS 
 
 This chapter will comprehensively chart the development of the EU's ongoing 
efforts to develop an autonomous security and defense component. It will examine the 
origins of European integration in the aftermath of the Second World War, as well as 
explain why the early attempts at European security cooperation failed. Placing a 
special emphasis on the role of the United States during the Cold War in fostering the 
European project, it will then move on to point out the transformation of the European 
security order in the post-Cold War era, as well as the opportunity that afforded the 
Europeans to begin to develop a new European security and defense framework. After 
examining the emergence of the EDSI, along with the debate over its relationship to 
NATO and the CJTF concept, and taking a look at the Petersberg tasks and the gradual 
shift to a more autonomous ESDP, this chapter will show how the EU finally resolved 
the operational hurdles necessary for it to become operational and take on its first 
security mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2003. A brief 
discussion of the proposed changes to the EU's security framework covered in the EU 
Constitution, which may or may not come into force in the future, will follow. By 
establishing why and how the EU constructed an increasingly autonomous security and 
defense policy in the ESDP, this chapter will help provide a useful framework for 
assessing Turkey's potential contribution.  
 Ever since the proposal of the Hussite king of Bohemia, George of Podebrady, 
in 1464 to create a union of Christian European nations which would “prevent war 
among the members...and ensure their common defense,” the vision of a unified Europe 
has been inextricably linked to the cause of common defense and security.5 The shared 
dream of a Europe secure under one banner has compelled generations of politicians, 
philosophes, and luminaries as diverse as Napoleon, Abbé Charles de Saint-Pierre, and 
Immanuel Kant. However, it took carnage on a scale hitherto unknown for these ideas 
to begin to be translated into political reality. Out of the mass mayhem of the First and 
Second World Wars, a new opportunity arose for Europe to remake itself. In the 
aftermath of the Second World War, there was a new impetus in Western Europe to 
bring an end to the cycle of power politics, conflict, and destruction which had so 
devastated the Continent in the first half of the 20th century.    
  In March of 1948, Britain, France, and the Benelux countries signed the Treaty 
                                                 
5Vaclav Havel, Speech to the Council of Europe, May 10, 1990, from website, 
http://old/hrad.cz/president/Havel/speeches/1990/1005_uk/htm. 
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of Brussels, a five-power alliance originally envisioned as a deterrent to future German 
aggression, which was seen at the time as the most pressing security concern on the 
Continent. However, during the very negotiation process for the Treaty, the European 
political situation was transformed virtually overnight, when, in February of 1948, the 
Czechoslovakian government capitulated to the 'liberating' Red Army. Facing the threat 
of Soviet expansionism across Central and Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union quickly 
replaced a reborn Germany as the primary security threat in the minds of most Western 
Europeans. Shortly thereafter, the Soviet blockade of Berlin in June of 1948 brought 
the major Western European powers together with the United States in common cause 
against the USSR, spurring negotiations between the two for a mutual military treaty. 
 A traditionally isolationist United States found itself forced to make a strong, 
significant, and lasting commitment to Western European security, in the form of the 
North Atlantic Treaty of April 1949 and the Mutual Assistance Act of October 1949. 
Similar in design to the Treaty of Brussels alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), under Article V, provides for the collective self-defense of all of 
its members by declaring that an attack on any one of them will be construed as an 
attack on them all. With the establishment of NATO, the Treaty of Brussels military 
structures were merged into the NATO framework and its responsibilities were taken 
on by the North Atlantic Alliance. More than any other organization, NATO shaped the 
Western security system during the Cold War, providing collective protection to 
Western Europe and North America against its Soviet bloc counterpoint, the Warsaw 
Pact. Thus, in the aftermath of the Second World War, security integration and 
cooperation in Western Europe took on a decidedly transatlantic character,  with the 
'Western bloc' economically, politically, and militarily dominated by the American 
superpower. In turn, this meant that efforts at European integration would be largely 
confined to the realm of 'low politics,' while the US would continue to primarily deal 
with the 'high' political concerns of security and defense policy.  
 Despite the primacy of the Soviet threat in the late 1940s and early 50s, the ex-
Allied powers of Western Europe were still concerned by the problem of how to 
reintegrate West Germany into the European security framework. This issue took on 
particular significance with the commencement of the Korean War in June of 1950, as 
West Germans realized the very real threat of a sudden surprise attack by their Eastern 
neighbor akin to that perpetrated by North Korea. German rearmament became a 
question of immediate importance, and Europe had to quickly find a way to ensure that 
West Germany could both rearm without threatening its neighbors and integrate into 
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the overall Western collective security framework. The significant potential German 
military contribution to Western security could no longer be forgone for fear of 
resurgent German military aggression. 
 French opposition to a rearmed German national military led them to suggest 
the creation of a fully integrated European Army, under the control of an organization 
called the 'European Defense Community' (EDC), which would be modeled along the 
lines of the then newly-created European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The 
'Pleven Plan,' as it was known, however, was defeated in the French National Assembly 
largely due to British non-involvement and a shift in French priorities away from 
European integration.6 Thus, the first security and defense scheme to truly foster 
European integration fell to the wayside. While European economic integration would 
continue in the following years, principally through the creation of the European 
Economic Community (EEC) in Rome in 1957, European security and defense 
integration would be largely divorced from the integration process and superseded by 
NATO for the next forty years.  
 In light of the failure of the EDC and the still ever-present necessity of finding a 
mechanism by which Germany could be included in the Western security framework, 
Britain put forth the idea of expanding the 1948 Brussels Treaty to include both 
Germany and Italy. Under pressure from an increasingly irritated American Secretary 
of State Dulles, and lacking any other alternative proposals, the British plan was 
approved and later formalized during the Paris conference of October 1954. Thus, 
Germany and Italy were formally invited to join the Treaty of Brussels and all seven 
signatories came together to establish the Western European Union (WEU). Under the 
WEU agreement, each member was to contribute a national military contingent to serve 
in NATO, under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). 
Through this rather backdoor route, Germany finally managed to join NATO proper in 
May of 1955.  
 While the creation of the WEU served its intended function of allowing German 
rearmament and the integration of Germany into the European security framework, the 
WEU was by no means as comprehensive, integrative, or bold a solution as the EDC 
had been. Although the WEU has long outlasted the, admittedly, rather limited 
rationale for its creation, it has been of more or less peripheral utility for much of that 
time, especially in comparison to the role the EDC was meant to play. The EDC was 
                                                 
6Gülnur Aybet, The Dynamics of European Security Cooperation, 1945-91, (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1997), p.81-82. 
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originally envisioned as one of the principal engines of integration in Europe, and in 
this aspect the WEU has fallen rather short: what integration of security and defense 
policy has taken place in the European context until recently has largely been 
accomplished through the NATO framework. In other words, with its task 
accomplished, having achieved German membership in NATO, the WEU was rendered 
effectively useless and the organization fell dormant for a number of years. Given 
American hegemony in security and defense and the effectiveness of American 
leadership through NATO, the WEU essentially had no room or reason to play an 
independent role and so it didn't. Accordingly, during this period of WEU dormancy, 
NATO served as the principal mechanism of European security and defense 
integration.  
 While there were further attempts to foster greater European integration in 
security and defense in the 1960s and 70s, the attempts ultimately also proved 
unsuccessful.  In 1960, French President de Gaulle proposed the establishment of a 
loosely organized political community of the EC member states which would be 
subordinated to national governments, rather than supranational in character. This 
organization was to be headquartered in Paris and would include four commissions, 
most notably one devoted to defense. In so doing, de Gaulle's hoped to reestablish 
French leadership in Europe by creating a security apparatus parallel to that of the 
WEU, but which excluded Britain. Further, by organizing regular meetings between the 
six defense ministers, de Gaulle sought to distance the community from NATO and 
thereby weaken American military leadership in Europe.7  Despite several attempts by 
de Gaulle, the so-called 'Fouchet plan' was shot down by the other members of the 
EEC, principally the Benelux countries, for failing to protect them against Franco-
German dominance by excluding Britain, as well as for attempting to fundamentally 
alter the basis of supranational European political integration that had been agreed upon 
in the 1957 Treaty of Rome. Thus, the first attempt to introduce a security and defense 
dimension into the EC failed, cementing NATO's role as the primary framework of 
European security.  
 In the late 1960s, with the end of the Gaullist era and British (as well as Irish 
and Danish) accession to the EC, there was a greater impetus to coordinate foreign 
policy issues through the Community structure. The Davignon report of 1970, 
commissioned by The Hague summit of 1969, advocated, “cooperation in the matter of 
foreign policy...to reinforce solidarity in favor of a harmonization of points of 
                                                 
7Ibid, p.94-98. 
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view...and wherever possible and desirable, common action.”8 This led to the creation 
of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) process, which, although informal and 
devoid of structures or institutions, facilitated dialog, information exchange, and 
cooperation in foreign policy between the EC member states. The EPC was finally 
given a formal legal basis through the Single European Act (SEA) of 1987. It is 
notable, however, that in the effort to bring about enhanced foreign policy cooperation 
through the EPC process, defense and security issues were left off the table, as the 
members were more comfortable with them being dealt with exclusively through the 
NATO forum.  
  In the late 1970s and early 1980s, European leaders began to feel what has been 
described as the 'abandonment-entrapment dilemma.'9 According to this logic, EC 
leaders began to feel increasing unable to make themselves heard in the bipolar US-
USSR dialog, particularly over arms control negotiations (the Intermediate Range 
Nuclear Forces Treaty), while, at the same time, they doubted the extent to which the 
US was truly committed to the strategic nuclear guarantee of defending Europe against 
the USSR. This general sense of insecurity was exacerbated by the perceived 
inefficiency and inability of the EPC process to respond to the global crises of the early 
80s, particularly in the cases of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran. Many in the EC felt as though they were unable to influence the 
dialog being carried out over their heads between the US and the USSR; they began to 
be acutely aware of the need for a new forum in which they could reassert their security 
and defense concerns. As the EPC process had proved itself unsuitable to the task, EC 
member states instead looked into their own past for viable alternatives and found the 
WEU.     
 The WEU was reactivated in 1984 under the Rome Declaration with an eye to 
finally establishing a “common European defense identity” within the North Atlantic 
Alliance framework, with the eventual goal in mind of solidifying the European pillar 
of NATO.10 The reactivation of the WEU was initiated by the French, who sought 
make use of the organization as more of a forum for discussion and debate on matters 
of security and defense than as an actual decision-making body.11  Notably, the Rome 
                                                 
8Le rapport du Luxembourg, Deuxieme partie, I, from website, 
http://www.ellopos.net/politics/davignon.htm, as translated by the author. 
9Aybet, p.133-34. 
10NATO Handbook, “Chapter 15:The Wider Institutional Framework for Security: the WEU,” from 
website, http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb1504.htm. 
11Sorin Lungu, “Attitudes Towards European Security, 1990-1997,” from website, 
www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Issues/amdipl_11/lungu.htm. 
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Declaration, under Article VIII of the Brussels Treaty, allowed for the WEU to 
consider the security implications for Europe of crises around the world. This new 
arrangement was brought to the test in August and October of 1987, when WEU 
meetings allowed for the coordination of a European military response to the threats of 
mining and attacks on shipping in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war. 'Operation 
Cleansweep' represented the first incidence of a coordinated European military activity 
taken through the WEU framework.   
 It was shortly thereafter, at the October 1987 Summit in The Hague, that 
members made the first organized effort to define the purpose of the WEU and it 
relationship with NATO, through the adoption of the 'Platform on European Security 
Interests.' In the 'Platform,' WEU foreign and defense ministers spelled out their 
commitment both to the development of a security and defense component to European 
integration and the unity of NATO through the strengthening of its European pillar.12 
This marked the true beginning of the creation of a permanent, independent, and 
comprehensive European defense identity and established the WEU as the European 
forum for security affairs. The WEU was further expanded in 1990 with the accession 
of both Spain and Portugal following ratification of the 1988 Treaty of Accession.  
 It is worth pausing here to note the crucial role played by the United States in 
enabling the project of European integration. by the United States. It was the American 
security commitment which provided Europe with a common conventional and nuclear 
'umbrella' against the Soviet threat during the Cold War and allowed Western European 
nations to begin the process of political and economic integration which has culminated 
in today's European Union. As Schnabel writes, “First, the EU was able to develop 
because it profited from the nuclear shield and other protection offered by the United 
States, both against the threat posed by the Soviet Union and from fears that old 
European rivalries would be renewed.”13 Free trade and economic cooperation and 
integration have a tendency to result in interdependence, which can be construed as a 
sign of national weakness or vulnerability. In the case of the European project, 
however, the role of the US as a kind of security guaranteer and arbiter above the fray 
allowed the European states to overlook these concerns. As Art writes, “Through its 
provision of military protection to its allies, the United States mitigated these security 
externalities of interdependence.”14 In short, the US security 'umbrella' during the Cold 
                                                 
12“Chapter 15:The Wider Institutional Framework for Security: the WEU.” 
13Rockwell Schnabel, “US View on the European CFSP,” from website 
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War helped to bind together the nations of Western Europe and allowed them to 
develop the European project by reducing interstate competition.  
 With the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, 
there followed a period of political transition and strategic reassessment for both the 
world at large and the Atlantic Alliance. The end of the Cold War was a crucial turning 
point for European security, as it provided an essential stimulus for the development of 
a renewed role in security for the EC/EU. The systemic change that occurred with the 
downfall of the Soviet Union gave Europe a window of opportunity to restructure and 
realign the European security framework. Although no one was clear on how this 'brave 
new world' would pan out, many in Europe saw the end of the East-West rivalry as an 
opportunity for the elaboration of a more autonomous European security and defense 
framework. Given that the original raison d'etre of NATO was to provide collective 
security for its members in the face of Soviet expansion, many in Europe, and 
especially in France, thought that NATO would either fade away or strictly limit itself 
to its Article V collective defense function.15 However, given NATO's remarkable 
adaptability to the post-Cold War world, its commitment to the continuing unity of the 
Alliance, and its expanding interests in collective security functions outside of Article 
V, those who sought a rebalancing of the US-European security relationship were 
forced to pursue it largely through the NATO framework. 
 One of the important motivations for the development of a more autonomous 
European security framework was the American's perennial complaint during the Cold 
War years of European 'free-riding' on the American conventional and nuclear security 
'umbrella.' According to the 'free-rider' argument, NATO can be understood along 
economic lines as  an organization devoted to the production of an international public 
good, collective security, for its constituent members. As Hartley and Sanders point 
out, this means NATO has two characteristics:  
First, a nation's consumption of defense does not effect the amount still 
available for other nations to consume...Second, once these goods are provided, 
they are available to everyone...This characteristic provides the incentive for a 
nation to 'free-ride' when it knows that other nations will provide sufficient 
alliance defense for its needs.16  
 
In American eyes, there was a major difference in defense spending, in terms of both 
                                                                                                                                              
Security, Vol. 15, No. 4, (Spring 1991), p.37. 
15David Yosh, NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Role in International Security, (Washington, 
DC: US Institute for Peace Press, 1998), p.208-09. 
16Keither Hartley and Todd Sander, “NATO Burden Sharing: Past and Future,” Journal of Peace 
Research, Vol. 36, No.6, November 1999, p.668.. 
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overall amounts and spending as a percentage of GDP, between the US and certain 
European allies, meaning that the US was effectively carrying more of costs of 
providing collective security while the Europeans reaped the benefit.  The US sought to 
restore the balance to defense spending within NATO by pushing for greater 'burden-
sharing' between the allies. The call for 'burden-sharing' became an even more common 
refrain with the end of the Cold War, as, with the rise of unchallenged worldwide 
American hegemony, it became unclear exactly who the Americans were protecting the 
Europeans against. This caused the US  to question its rationale for continuing to incur 
the significant expenses involved in maintaining the American commitment to 
European security and provided more pressure on the Europeans to take an increased 
responsibility for their own defense.  
 The Maastricht Summit of December 1991, and the subsequent Treaty on 
European Union ('Treaty of Maastricht') signed in February of 1992, ushered in a new 
era for the European Union in matters of security and defense. The Treaty introduced a 
restructuring of the EU into three 'pillars': the Community pillar ('first pillar'), the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) pillar ('second pillar'), and the Justice 
and Home Affairs pillar ('third pillar'). The CFSP, although established on the 
foundation of the EPC process dating back to 1970, was significantly expanded through 
the Treaty of Maastricht. Importantly, the Treaty gives all EU member states the 
automatic right to join the WEU. Further, instead of simply trying to foster cooperation, 
as was the case under the EPC process, the CFSP is intended to generate and support 
common positions between the member states through unanimity. As the text indicates, 
once these common positions had been unanimously reached, member states have an 
obligation to, “support the Union's external and security policy actively and 
unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity.”17 Thus, once a common 
position has been agreed upon by all the member states through the European Council, 
they are enjoined by the Treaty to actively support the Union's consensus. This marks 
quite a significant departure from the weak language of the EPC process.  
 Furthermore, the CFSP is designed to move beyond just policy-making to 
policy implementation through the use of a new tool referred to as 'joint action.' This 
allows the EU to translate common positions into something more substantive by 
establishing the scope, means, and objectives in situations in which action is deemed 
necessary. Significantly, these then become commitments which the member states are 
                                                 
17Maastricht Treaty, Title V, Article J.1-4, from website, 
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obligated to honor. Further, Maastricht expands the scope of security cooperation from 
merely the economic aspects of security covered by the EPC process to all aspects of 
foreign policy related to security. However, the Treaty also distinguishes between the 
role of the CFSP and that of the WEU, in that the WEU remains the sole body accorded 
the responsibility to, “elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union 
which have defense implications.”18 Thus, the Treaty draws the distinction between 
foreign and security policy and direct defense and military action. 
 Moreover, the Maastricht Treaty, while expanding the scope of European 
security and defense integration through the CFSP, also recognizes the special 
importance of the long-established security relationship that many EU member states 
have with NATO.  The Treaty states that, the Union, in framing the CFSP, “shall 
respect the obligations of certain Member States under the North Atlantic Treaty and be 
compatible with the common security and defense policy established within that 
framework.”19 This is to say, in other words, that the EU's CFSP is effectively 
superseded by NATO obligations and policies and its latitude for independent action is 
somewhat circumscribed by NATO-imposed limits. Given the present 
underdevelopment of European military capabilities and the continuing importance of 
the American contribution to European security through the NATO alliance, this is 
merely a practical reflection of reality. While the Treaty leaves room for the future 
development of, “a common defense policy, which may in time lead to a common 
defense,” it is clear that for the present this remains a distant prospect.20 As some have 
noted, the vagueness of this phrase reflects an underlying compromise made by the 
member states at Maastricht, between those who sought a more explicit and expedited 
development of a defense role for the EU and those who opposed any mention of 
defense at all.21 This is a contentious issue within the CFSP that the Treaty left open for 
further discussion in the future.                  
 The June 1992 WEU Council of Ministers meeting outside Bonn in Germany 
issued the 'Petersberg Declaration,' a document which spelled out the organization's 
future development along the guidelines established a year earlier with the Maastricht 
Treaty. The Declaration advanced practical WEU structural organization by creating 
the WEU Planning Cell to both plan for possible future missions and keep track of the 
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operational forces made available to the WEU for missions by its members. Most 
importantly, however, the Petersberg Declaration established for the first time the types 
of operations that the WEU would involve itself with in the future, above and beyond 
its Article V common defense obligations under the Brussels Treaty. The WEU 
member states pledged to make forces available to pursue so-called 'Petersberg tasks,' 
involving humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping, crisis management, and 
peacemaking, either on an independent WEU basis or in conjunction with the CSCE or 
the UN Security Council. The Declaration is notable as a significant step forward in the 
organizational development of a European security and defense framework. 
Importantly, this step was taken through the WEU, and not NATO, framework, and 
was thus consequential as it was an independently-made European decision about the 
future of European security. 
 The experience of extensive dependency on American resources in the conflicts 
in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s convinced many of the European states of the 
painful need to increase their military capabilities, especially in crucial high-tech areas, 
such as satellite intelligence, lift capacity, and precision weapons.22 As one European 
general, in discussing the Europeans' experience in Bosnia, stated, "Kosovo was a real 
wake-up call. The EU members of NATO performed badly. They completely relied on 
the US."23 Furthermore, the strong reluctance of the US to commit ground troops in 
Bosnia for 'Petersberg tasks' effectively ruled out the use of NATO in such situations, 
contributing to a increasing realization that Europe needed a capacity in which to act on 
its own if necessary. This was exacerbated with the onset of the Kosovo crisis in 1998, 
when Europe yet again remained dependent on the US and NATO to formulate a 
response. Most lastingly, however, the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia began to 
cause many in Europe, including the British, to doubt the durability of the American 
security commitment to Europe. As The Economist wrote in the midst of the war in 
Bosnia, “the new impetus for strengthening the WEU comes partly from America’s 
belief that Europe ought to shoulder more of the common defense burden, but more 
from a recent growth of doubt in Europe about the durability of America’s military 
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commitment to Europe.”24 
 The distinction drawn by the Petersberg Declaration between Article V tasks 
and non-Article V Petersburg tasks led some in Europe, and most especially in France, 
to argue that the two functions should be separated, with NATO focusing exclusively 
on matters of collective defense, leaving the WEU in charge of Petersberg tasks. The 
crisis in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s and the US refusal to commit ground 
troops in Bosnia before the signing of a peace agreement added fuel to this fire. At the 
same time, increasing French rapprochement with NATO in the early 1990s provided a 
strong voice for the articulation of an independent European security and defense 
policy which could draw on NATO assets as necessary in dealing with non-Article V 
missions, like Yugoslavia, in which NATO wouldn't act.  
 However, despite their desires for increasing autonomy, the European NATO 
members remain heavily reliant on American military capabilities, especially in sea and 
air lift, communications, satellite intelligence, and power projection. Thus, although 
many wished to articulate a divergent security agenda, dependency on NATO, and 
especially American military capabilities, fostered the growth of European security and 
defense integration within the clearly NATO-linked framework of the WEU. As 
Eduardo Serra, Spain's former Defense Minister wrote, “The reality today is that we 
Europeans could do almost anything with the US; but without the US, we can do very 
little; and against the US, we can do absolutely nothing.”25 For the Europeans to be able 
to accomplish anything at all, they had to accept the bargain of dominant American 
leadership in return for access to necessary US assets. Otherwise, without the 
Americans, the Europeans could not develop or deliver on their security goals at all. 
This has proved to be one of the central problems facing the development of a more 
autonomous European security and defense in the aftermath of the Cold War. 
 The Petersburg Declaration, along with the 'Document on Associate 
Membership' adopted at the Rome Ministerial in November of 1992, further extended 
associate membership in the WEU to NATO members which were not part of the 
European Union, including Turkey, Iceland, and Norway. These associate members 
could fully participate in both the meetings and the missions of the WEU, although they 
do not have full voting rights in the organization. At the same time in 1992, another 
class of WEU membership was also developed, observer status, for EU member states 
who, due to their neutral status, do not participate in NATO. Two years later, with the 
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'Kirchberg Declaration' issued during the Council of Ministers meeting in Luxembourg 
in May 1994, a final WEU-affiliation status, associate partners, was created for 
countries, such as the Baltic states, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Slovenia, that 
were members of neither NATO nor the EU. The Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
Poland also joined the WEU as associate members in 1999, short after becoming 
members of NATO in the same year. Within a relatively short time frame, the WEU 
managed to expand its organizational reach across much of the European continent 
through the extensive use of associational agreements. 
 The January 1994 NATO summit in Brussels significantly furthered NATO-
WEU cooperation when all 16 Alliance member states unanimously approved the idea 
of creating an independent European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within the 
NATO framework. The ESDI, it was hoped, would be a new mechanism by which the 
European allies could strengthen the European pillar of NATO and take on more 
responsibility for their own defense and security affairs while continuing to maintain 
the transatlantic ties at NATO's core.  In order to avoid duplication of military 
capabilities and competition between NATO and the WEU, the Combined Joint Task 
Force (CJTF) Concept was developed to allow, in the event of a NATO decision not to 
take action in a particular situation, for the sharing of NATO assets with the WEU.  
 As the WEU envisions responding to a wide variety of unpredictable and 
distinctly different challenges in its Petersburg tasks (peacekeeping, humanitarian 
missions, etc), this modular CJTF framework will allow it to rapidly build mission-
specific capabilities and resources by borrowing from NATO, as well as from WEU 
member states and non-NATO actors, to maximize a coherent and flexible response.26 
Principal among those assets that the WEU would need to borrow from NATO are 
those key to infrastructure, satellite intelligence, logistics, and communications. 
Furthermore, efficient pooling of European military capabilities is of particular 
importance for the WEU given the relatively low levels of defense spending among 
European member states as compared to the US. The CJTF enhances the utility of the 
WEU by allowing it to focus more of its energies and monies on preparing response 
strategies for Petersburg task missions while retaining the significant advantage of 
access to NATO resources and capabilities.  
 The NATO Berlin Meeting of June 1996 stressed the importance of locating the 
emerging ESDI concept squarely within a NATO framework. Through the CJTF 
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Concept, the WEU can make use of NATO resources and capabilities to develop a 
distinct ESDI.  This nesting of the ESDI within NATO is what is referred to as making 
the WEU and NATO “separable but not separate.”27 This concept would be applied to 
both resources as well as command structures. The meeting emphasized the idea that 
these new European command structures within NATO could be developed to run 
WEU-led missions through the 'double-hatting' of personnel, i.e., making certain 
individuals simultaneously responsible for roles in both NATO and WEU command 
structures.28  
 The adoption of this new 'ESDI within NATO' concept marks a strong attempt 
by NATO to answer one of the longest standing dilemmas about transatlantic security 
relations: while the US has pressured the European allies to not be 'free riders' by 
enhancing their defense spending and developing their own capabilities, if they actually 
did so, what need would there be for NATO?29 By binding the development of an ESDI 
to the NATO framework, and making its operational capability contingent on NATO 
resources, the Alliance seems to think that it has essentially found a way of having its 
cake and eating it, too. However, despite NATO's enthusiastic rhetoric about the ESDI-
CJTF mechanism, there remains a good deal of ambiguity over its actual 
implementation.30 Which assets NATO is willing to share and under what 
circumstances remain open questions, as the boundaries of this increased European 
autonomy and the 'more equal partnership' have yet to be clearly drawn. 
  The October 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam furthered development of  both the 
CFSP and the the ESDI by introducing a number of important new modifications to the 
existing EU treaties. In order to facilitate the CFSP, Amsterdam effectively introduced 
the possibility of decision making by majority vote, through the creation of a new 
voting status, 'constructive abstention,' which would allow member states a third option 
aside from either an approval or a veto. Further, the Treaty added a third tool to the 
CFSP arsenal, alongside the established mechanisms of 'common positions' and 'joint 
action:' 'common strategies.' This new tool would allow the member states to adopt 
consensus decisions on common strategies in areas where they have significant 
common interests. Under Article 26, the Treaty establishes the new position of 'High 
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Representative for the CSFP,' to be filled by the Secretary-General of the European 
Council, in an effort to raise the profile of the CFSP as well as increase its coherence. 
This organizational change was meant to give 'a name and a face' to the EU's CFSP for 
both the European public and the wider world. These practical changes helped to 
enhance the capabilities and effectiveness of the CFSP. 
 But the changes enacted by the Treaty of Amsterdam also had significant 
ramifications for the development of ESDI. Although the concept of the 'Petersburg 
tasks' had been widely discussed in EU circles for several years (eg, the Petersburg 
Declaration), Amsterdam marked the formal inclusion of these tasks into Article V of 
the EU Treaty. Additionally, the Treaty opened the door to the possible future 
integration of the WEU directly into the EU framework. It states that, “The Union shall 
accordingly foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the 
possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should the European Council 
so decide.”31 
 Amsterdam also brought about the harmonization of the presidencies of the EU 
and the WEU, with a notable exception for the neutral EU member states (Sweden, 
Austria, Ireland, and Finland). While seemingly a minor transformation, this step was 
actually of significant importance because it allowed the EU to sidestep the question of  
which country would in effect take on the leadership of the WEU. Further, the Treaty 
expands the role of the CFSP in European security by stating that, “the European 
Council shall define the principles and general guidelines for the common foreign and 
security policy, including for matters with defense implications.”32  This marks a 
significant revision of the Maastricht Treaty, wherein matters 'with defense implication' 
were to be dealt with separately from the CFSP through the WEU forum. These 
changes illustrate how the Treaty of Amsterdam began the process of folding the WEU 
directly into the EU's second pillar.  
 The joint Franco-British St. Malo Declaration of December 1998 gave 
substance to the security goals spelled out in the Treaty of Amsterdam by forging a 
consensus between the EU's two largest military power on the need for a designated 
European military force to deal with Petersburg tasks. As the Declaration explains, “the 
Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military 
forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to 
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international crises.”33 The Declaration marked a profound change in traditional British 
security policy towards the EU, as it effectively reversed their prior opposition to the 
establishment of an independent ESDI and paved the way for future practical steps to 
be taken within the EU. As Serfaty points out, “St. Malo was important because it 
signaled a change in traditional stances on the part of both Great Britain and France. 
Because Britain was now a leader in the effort, it also assuaged US concerns.”34 At the 
European Council meeting in Cologne the following June, the Council took advantage 
of this new impetus and granted the EU, “the necessary means and capabilities 
necessary to assume its responsibilities regarding a Common European Security and 
Defense Policy (CESDP).”35 Given the British green light to proceed with European 
security integration, the EU was beginning to progressively assume the responsibilities 
previously held by the WEU.  
 The 50th anniversary NATO Summit in Washington, DC in April of 1999, while 
highlighting the continuing importance of the half-century old transatlantic alliance, 
fully endorsed the concrete steps that had been taken over the past five years to develop 
the ESDI within the NATO framework. This Summit marked another major turning 
point for the development of a more autonomous European security framework. As for 
particulars, at the meeting, the Alliance stressed the so-called 'Berlin-plus' 
arrangements that had been made for the sharing of NATO assets and capabilities, 
intelligence, and command structures with the WEU.36 In NATO-WEU negotiations, it 
was determined that NATO would decide to aid to WEU-led missions operating 
outside of the North Atlantic framework on a case by case basis through the North 
Atlantic Council (NAC). This is noteworthy because by making such decisions through 
the NAC, the setup would preserve in all such cases the voice and vote of NATO 
members who were not  members of the EU, including Iceland and Norway, the 
Central and Eastern European states, and Turkey.   
 The European Council Meeting in Helsinki in December 1999 furthered the 
Council's directive to develop autonomous operational capabilities for EU-led missions 
in situations of international crisis. Most significantly, it was agreed at Helsinki that, as 
the Presidency Conclusions states, “cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, 
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Member States must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 
1 year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of 
Petersburg tasks.”37 The actualization of this so-called 'Headline Goal'  to create a 
European 'Rapid Reaction Force' (RRF) is highly important, as, when completed, it 
would finally give the EU the tangible and separate military capabilities to lead EU 
missions outside of a NATO context, a goal that many in Europe have worked towards 
for over three decades. To further this end, Helsinki also agreed to establish a host of 
new military and political bodies to direct and manage EU-led operations. Helsinki 
made it clear, however, that these new structures would not compromise the existing 
NATO framework and would be designed to continue full cooperation and 
collaboration between the EU and NATO.  
  The European Council Meeting at Nice in December of 2000 established 
several new EU bodies to help coordinate the developing CESDP: the Political and 
Security Committee (PSC), the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), and the 
EU Military Staff (EUMS). The PSC is charged with the mission of taking charge of all 
aspects of the CFSP, including those related to the CESDP, as well as guiding the EU's 
response to international crises. The EUMC, composed of military representatives of 
the member states' Chiefs of Defense (CHODs), and is designed to offer advice and 
recommendations to the PSC and direction to the EUMS. The EUMS, drawn from the 
ranks of member states' national militaries, is tasked with the duty of monitoring and 
analyzing the global situation, planning Petersburg tasks, and implementing the 
directives of the EUMC. These interlocking bodies of advice, decision-making, and 
implementation, building on the prior model of the WEU's Planning Cell, were 
designed to offer the EU the full range of integrated multinational military planning 
capabilities for its envisioned future Petersburg tasks.  
 At the December 2001 meeting in Laeken, Belgium, the European Council 
declared that, “the Union is now capable of conducting some crisis-management 
operations...development of the means and capabilities at its disposal will enable the 
Union to take on more demanding operations.”38 The Copenhagen European Council 
Meeting in December of 2002 declared that, with all 'Berlin-plus' permanent 
arrangements between the EU and NATO completed, the EU was now ready and 
willing to take over operational responsibilities for both Security Force (SFOR) in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and the mission in former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
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(fYROM). The EU launched its first military operation, code name 'Concordia,' to 
fYROM in March of 2003, making use of NATO resources and capabilities as agreed 
under 'Berlin-plus.' In June of 2003 the EU also launched its first (albeit rather short) 
off continent mission, code name 'Artemis,' in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
The EU's first truly sizable ESDP operation began in December of 2004, however, with 
the 7,000 troop EUFOR 'Althea' mission to replace the outgoing NATO SFOR.  Thus, 
at present, it seems as though the EU, through both its continuing security and defense 
integration and its Berlin-plus cooperation with NATO, is beginning to develop the 
operational capabilities necessary to organize and carry out a truly common European 
security and defense policy.   
 The EU filled in a crucial gap in its CFSP-ESDP with the approval of the 
European Security Strategy at the European Council meeting in Brussels in December 
of 2003. As van Ham writes, it aims, ”to address the weakest link in Europe's role as an 
emerging global power: the connection between its lofty objectives and its 
uncoordinated policy instruments.”39 This document, authored by EU High 
Representative Javier Solana, spells out the major foreseeable threats to European 
security, as well as the strategic objectives of the Union's CFSP in attempting to 
address these threats. The ESS establishes the key threats to EU security as terrorism, 
proliferation of WMDs, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime (with an 
focus on drugs, arms, and people trafficking). The document also emphasizes the future 
potential for the EU and its CFSP to take on a larger role in world affairs, stating, “The 
increasing convergence of European interests and the strengthening of mutual solidarity 
of the EU makes us a more credible and effective actor. Europe should be ready to 
share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.”40  
 Interestingly, in parts the ESS strikes a surprisingly similar chord to that of the 
current administration in Washington and its doctrine of 'pre-emption:' 
With the new threats, the first line of defense will often be abroad. The risks of 
proliferation  grow over time; left alone, terrorist networks will become ever 
more dangerous. This implies that we should be ready to act before a crisis 
occurs. Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early.41 
 
As Van Ham writes, “For the EU, [these statements] imply a remarkable shift towards 
accepting the conceptual underpinnings of the current US administration's 
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worldview.”42 However, the document also emphasizes that the response to these new 
challenges should be comprehensive and not merely reliant on the use of the Union's 
developing military means. It states that, “none of the new threats is purely military; 
nor can any be tackled by purely military means... The European Union is particularly 
well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations.”43 Thus, while the EU is 
interested in taking on a more active and involved role in international affairs, 
including the use of more traditional 'hard' security means, it will not attempt to focus 
on their use exclusively and will instead try to strike a balance between 'hard' and 'soft' 
measures to create more comprehensive solutions to the challenges faced by European 
security today. The ESS marks a significant and necessary step in the elaboration of a 
European CFSP-ESDP and provides the EU with a solid framework for 
operationalizing its foreign and security policy goals.  
 Although it has not yet come into effect, it is also worth considering the 
potential impact on of the EU Constitution on the development of the CFSP-ESDP. The 
proposed European Union Constitution, which was released in June of 2004, makes 
two major changes to the existing structure of the Union's CFSP: it creates the new role 
of EU Minister for Foreign Affairs and the European External Action Service. The 
Minister for Foreign Affairs would take on the responsibility for both helping to 
develop, coordinate, and implement the CFSP, as well as serving as an internationally 
recognizable 'name and a face' for the CFSP in external affairs. The European External 
Action Service would essentially be the EU's diplomatic corps, which would work to 
aid in the implementation of CFSP policies in conjunction with the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs.44 Under Article I-12 (4), the Constitution also reiterates the EU's, “competence 
to define and implement a common foreign and security policy, including the 
progressive framing of a common defense policy.”45 
In terms of the scope of the overall development of the CFSP, the changes in the 
Constitution are relatively minor, although the creation of a Minister for Foreign 
Affairs would probably provide a big boost in raising the public awareness of the 
CFSP. However, given rejections of the EU Constitution in major referendums in both 
France and the Netherlands in late May and early June this year has seriously called 
into question whether or not these policies will come into effect. For the moment at 
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least, the future implementation of these news measures for the CFSP remains 
uncertain.     
 The fifty year process of European security and defense integration has been a 
time of fitful starts and stops, of promising proposals that sputter out and amount to 
nothing, only to be tossed in the bin and replaced with something newer and better. 
While the present operational capabilities of the EU in the ESDP are still in their 
infancy, they nonetheless represent a remarkable triumph when held against the 
background of the post-War Europe of 1945. Furthermore, there is no standard against 
which we can compare their progress, as nothing like the EU project has ever been 
attempted before. The decade and a half since the end of  the Cold War has seen 
impressive, if incomplete, progress towards the objectives of the CFSP and the ESDP, 
and the EU is just beginning to come into its own as an organization capable of 
carrying out the lofty goals of its Petersberg tasks.  
 While doubtless the EU's capabilities will remain in NATO's shadow for the 
foreseeable future, this should not be taken to mean that the EU cannot and will not 
play an increasingly important role in European and world security at large. For the 
present, however, the EU's efforts remain somewhat hampered by its lack of military 
capabilities; while it has focused intensively on the development of institutional 
structures and foreign and security policy objectives, this has not replaced the need for 
serious, long-term defense investment if the reality of the EU's CFSP-ESDP is to match 
its rhetoric. At a certain point, the EU must decide what kind of security role it truly 
sees itself playing in the future, be it local, regional, or global, and it must dedicate the 
necessary resources accordingly to seeing that vision through. 
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CHAPTER 3: SECURITY POLICY PREFERENCES OF THE UNITED STATES 
AND EU MEMBER STATES  
  
 This chapter will examine the emergence of the ESDP from the point of view of 
the preferences of the EU member states, as well as those of the US. The section will 
proceed using the framework of the rationalist school of political theory, which posits 
that nations are rational actors and that their foreign policy decisions are made on the 
basis of cost-benefit analysis of which of their preferred goals can be attained at a 
minimum cost. As Rittenberger explains, ”Theories that rely on the model of homo 
economicus conceive of actors as self-interested (or more generally, goal 
oriented)...[whose] behavior results from rational calculations of costs and benefits. 
Actors consciously pursue goals which they strive to attain at a minimum of costs.”46 
The version of rationalism employed in this case is as liberal intergovernmentalism, as 
laid out by Andrew Moravcsik, which posits that the EU is an intergovernmental 
institution in which policy experts from the individual member states, “formulate 
national bargaining positions matching their state national interests.”47   After looking 
at the security preferences of the EU-25 member states, the chapter will then close by 
examining the fierce debate in Europe over the US-led Iraq War, during which the 
different preferences of the EU member states could be clearly seen manifesting 
themselves in an unusually visible manner. 
 While Europe has come a long way in the past fifty years towards beginning to 
establish the skeletal framework for a common European security and defense policy, 
not all actors in the realm of European security have the same vision in mind. Despite 
the EU goals of compromise and cooperation, each state has its own national security 
and defense preferences which guide the positions they adopt on the issues of the 
ESDI/ESDP, NATO, and the future of European security and defense integration. 
Although it is something of a cliché, it nonetheless remains largely true that European 
preferences in security and defense can be seen as a spectrum from the 'Atlanticists' 
approach, represented by the UK, to the 'Europeanist' one, represented by France, with 
all other states falling somewhere in between.48 While the EU has now expanded to 25 
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members, the primary actors in European security and defense are relatively few in 
number, including the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy (to a lesser extent), 
and, above all, the United States. While the United States is obviously not a European 
state geographically, its present hegemonic power in the world and its five plus decades 
of intimate involvement in European security mean that it casts a long shadow across 
the Continent in all such matters.  
 As the last chapter detailed, in recent years, European states have taken a 
number of steps towards the creation of a integrated European approach to security and 
defense through the EU framework. Although the tangible results of these efforts have 
so far been limited, this process represents an important new dynamic in European 
security. While Europe was largely confined to a secondary role in the Cold War era 
transatlantic security partnership, the end of the Cold War and systemic transformation 
has opened the door to the possibility of a more prominent and more independent 
European voice. However, if Europe is to play an increasingly significant role on the 
world stage through the EU framework, it must find ways of transcending the 
Continent's myriad national diversity to forge common European positions on matters 
of security and defense. 
 The European Union remains at its core an effort to develop a unipolar Europe 
from a multiplicity of constituent nation state actors. Driven by the Franco-German 
'engine' and with the implicit security guarantee of the United States, EU member states 
have sought to make integration acceptable through policies of 'self-binding' and 
'benign power employment.' 49 By limiting their own power through multilateralism, 
bargaining, and consensus politics, the major European powers have made it possible 
for the smaller states to be absorbed into the European order without fear of domination 
and subordination.50 However, integration in the field of security and defense policy 
remains a more complex task than economic and political integration because it is so 
inextricably tied to the national level interests and preferences of individual states. 
Thus, an examination of the interests of the EU's principal powers, as well as those of 
the United States, should help shed some light on the parameters of the debate and the 
challenges facing the project of European security and defense integration. Although 
the United States is not by geography a European nation, its influence in European 
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security and defense has been predominant since the Second World War and thus its 
preferences must be examined at length in any discussion on the subject.  
 
The United States of America 
 
 The United States has played a crucial role in Europe defense and security since 
the end of the Second World War, helping to rebuild, rearm, and unify a war-torn 
Western Europe against the threat of Soviet expansionism. The explicit US military 
commitment to European security gave Europeans the sense of stability, predictability, 
and psychological reassurance necessary to rebuild their societies and economies in the 
uncertain and turbulent times following the war.51 Given its overwhelming military 
superiority, the active role played by the US in post-war security helped 'balance' the 
European inter-state system by assuaging concerns over German rearmament. The US 
made it 'safe' for other European nations to engage in security cooperation with 
Germany by restraining the German military threat through its own greater dominance 
within the alliance and on the ground military presence in Germany. The transatlantic 
collective security and defense framework was established through by the organization 
of NATO with the Treaty of Washington in April of 1949.  
 The American security commitment provided Europe with a common 
conventional and nuclear 'umbrella' against the Soviet threat during the Cold War. 
American hegemony and the American military commitment to Europe facilitated the 
process of economic and political integration by providing security guarantees against 
both traditional European interstate rivalry and the threat of Soviet military 
expansionism. In such a situation, the European states could proceed with the process 
of integration and bind themselves together without the risk of the project degenerating 
into a new form of domination by the Continent's major powers. In effect, the US Cold 
War-era security 'umbrella' helped to bring together the nations of Western Europe and 
allowed them to develop the European project that would become the EU by reducing 
interstate competition and helping to promote ties of economic interdependency.  
 In general, during the Cold War, the US maintained a 'hands off' approach to the 
process of European integration, with the perspective in mind both that, as they were 
free sovereign nations, the European states could pursue as they wish and that, facing 
the threat of the Soviet Union, an integrated Europe would be beneficial for both 
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NATO and Western democracy in general.52 Accordingly, the United States has 
maintained diplomatic relations with the EU and its forerunners from the onset, 
beginning with its observers to the ECSC in 1953 and its first mission to the EC in 
1961.  Especially in the early years of the Cold War, the US viewed European 
integration as the best way of ensuring that the European nations would swiftly rebuild 
their defense capabilities and take on greater responsibility for balancing the Soviet 
Union in Europe.  
 This American focus on increasing the European contribution to Allied defense, 
the so-called 'burden-sharing debate,' was to become one of the hallmarks of the Cold 
War, as many American critics, correctly or not, derided the Europeans (especially, 
Denmark, Iceland, Luxembourg, et al.) for 'free-riding' on the US security 'umbrella' by 
not doing their part in contributing to the military costs of deterring the Soviet Union.53 
At the same time, however, if the Europeans were to significantly increase their defense 
spending and enhance their military capabilities, they could potentially undermine the 
American leadership and dominance of NATO.54 In essence, according to Cornish, the 
US wanted the Europeans to, “do more, not necessarily be more.”55 
 Everything changed, however, with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of 
the Soviet Union in 1991, which brought about a radical transformation in the 
geopolitical dynamic and the emergence of a unipolar world with the US as the sole 
hegemonic power. As Colin Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
memorably stated, “I'm running out of demons. I’m running out of enemies. I’m down 
to Castro and Kim Il Sung.”56 Many in Europe began to argue that, in the absence of 
the Soviet Union, the value of US military power would diminish and that there would 
no longer be a need for US protection.57 The challenges in the post-Cold War world no 
longer involved a direct threat to the security of NATO states, but instead were 
concerned with more indirect threats from spread of WMDs, terrorism, refugees and 
migration, and regional conflicts on Europe's periphery. 
 Additionally, the French post-Cold War rapprochement with NATO interjected 
a powerful and divergent new voice into the dialogue and provided a strong impetus for 
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change. This led to an increasing push among many European states for a 
'Europeanization' of the Alliance and the creation of a distinctly 'Europeanist' approach 
to European security; while at the same time, more than ever before, France began to 
push for European security cooperation outside the NATO framework.58 Among other 
measures, in February of 1991, France and Germany jointly submitted a proposal to the 
European Council's IGC supporting the development of the CFSP and the  
transformation of the WEU into Europe's primary security structure.59 Further, 
following the definition of the so-called 'Petersberg tasks' in 1992, the French began to 
push for a distinction to be made between NATO-led Article V missions and ESDI 
non-Article V operations (e.g., crisis management or peace enforcement) which would 
draw on NATO resources without direct NATO (i.e. American) involvement.    
 The potential for the fracturing of the Alliance implicit in some of the these 
post-Cold War French proposals motivated the US Undersecretary of State 
Bartholomew to send a 'note' in March of 1991 to European leaders, which made it 
clear that, although the US values a European voice in NATO, it would not accept 
unified and independent European 'caucus' on defense that would challenge 
Washington's leadership role.60 Further, regarding France's proposed NATO-WEU 
Article V- Non-Article V mission distinction, Washington was less than thrilled by the 
prospect of being essentially sidelined in precisely the sorts of crises that are 
increasingly likely to occur in the post-Cold War world (non-Article V operations), 
while simultaneously being asked to hop to the European's defense in the event of a 
more serious threat to their security (Article V operations). As US Undersecretary of 
Defense for Policy Walter Slocombe stated, “It is essential from the US point of view 
not to foster a bifurcated NATO, in which, de facto if not explicitly, there are two 
systems, one for the US and Article V, and one for Europe and non-Article V 
operations.” This stance has remained one of the major tenets of post-Cold War 
American security policy in Europe. 
 The United States has supported the creation of a ESDI/ESDP, so long as it 
takes place within the context of NATO and does not usurp the primacy or disrupt the 
unity of the NATO transatlantic security relationship. The Americans strongly favor 
strengthening the European pillar of NATO through the ESDP, especially if it will lead 
to greater development of European military capabilities and more burden-sharing 
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within the Alliance.61 This is particularly necessary because, as the War in Afghanistan 
point out yet again in 2001, there still exists a substantial capabilities gap between the 
US and the EU. As Dempsey explains, “Citing the war in Afghanistan, where the EU 
could do little more than cheer the U.S. on from the sidelines, U.S. and NATO officials 
have been chiding the EU for its failure to back up its ambitions on the global stage 
with real military muscle.”62 While this may be starting to change somewhat since the 
War in Afghanistan, the EU will still be reliant on borrowing NATO and US assets for 
use in more challenging peace-making and crisis intervention missions for the 
foreseeable future. 
 At the same time, for the US, in developing the ESDP, the European states must 
be careful not to duplicate structures and capabilities already present within NATO. 
The 1994 NATO Brussels Summit and the 1996 'Berlin-plus' agreement approved the 
establishment of an independent ESDI within NATO and authorized the use of the 
CJTF Concept to allow NATO-WEU resource and capability sharing with precisely 
these concerns in mind. The ESDP-'Berlin-plus' arrangement will allow the EU to make 
use of NATO resources and capabilities to develop an independent European identity 
within a unified NATO without duplication, while ensuring that NATO and the EU 
remain 'separable, but not separate' entities. As Larrabee writes, “the US wants ESDI to 
evolve in a way that does not weaken NATO and the trans-Atlantic link.”63 This was 
underlined in the agreement reached at the 1999 Washington, D.C. NATO Summit in 
which the Alliance endorsed the concept of European security autonomy such that the 
Europeans can, “take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance is not 
engaged.”64 Again, this illustrates that the US is amenable to the development of the 
ESDP, provided that it is subordinate, as well as complementary, to NATO.  
 From the American perspective, however, it seems as though the EU frequently 
underestimates the challenges involved in establishing such a common policy: as the 
EU must take account of widely divergent security interests, ranging from its three 
major powers, four neutral states, to its recently added former Warsaw Pact members, 
in drawing up its ESDP/CFSP, the creation of commonly held positions and policies in 
the absence of clear leadership seems something of a difficult task at best. And, as the 
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recent turbulence over the Iraq War illustrated, it is one in which the EU has yet to iron 
out all the kinks.65 NATO works precisely because American dominance provides 
leadership in the Alliance, but the EU, with several competing major powers (Germany, 
UK, France), lacks this clearly established leadership, rendering decision-making 
difficult. While the lack of European capabilities has proved a challenge in the 
development of the ESDP concept, its primary hurdle has been and continues to remain 
the lack of clear leadership within the EU of the project. Despite these challenges, the 
US is favorable to the development of the ESDP, and particularly to the idea of 
Europeans doing more to provide for their own security, just as long as it 
unambiguously takes place through the established NATO framework.  
 Furthermore, by pursuing the ESDP through a NATO framework, the EU could 
retain the voice, insight, and contribution of the European NATO members that are not 
members of the Union (Turkey, Iceland, Norway, to which could be added Bulgaria 
and Romania after they joined NATO in 2004). By transitioning from the 'inclusive' 
WEU, which allowed for associate membership for non-WEU states, to the more 
'exclusive' EU-centric ESDP, the EU runs the risks of duplicating assets and structures 
and widening fault lines within the Alliance. The US government has stressed that the 
EU must not discriminate against European non-EU member states within NATO in the 
development of the ESDP.66 Moreover, down the line, the US government would like 
to see a greater convergence between the memberships of NATO and the European 
Union, with the goal in mind of bringing about greater complementarity between the 
two organizations.67 Accordingly, the US government has publicly pushed for EU 
membership for non-EU NATO members who desire it, most notably in the case of 
Turkey.   
 It seems as though a great deal of the distinction between the US and EU 
approaches in foreign and security policy is dependent on the tenor of the 
administration in Washington, although the US is seemingly generally more willing to 
resort to the use of force than the Europeans. The previous administration, under 
President Clinton, was marked by a much greater concern for multilateralism and 
coalition building when it did intervene, as well as a focus on humanitarian intervention 
and crisis management in its chosen missions. The Clinton administration's policy of 
                                                 
65Schnabel, p.6. 
66Larrabee. 
67Amb. Marc Grossman,  Assistant Sec. State, Bureau of European Affairs,”NATO's Role in the Next 
Millennium:Constant and Emerging Goals,” USIA, US Foreign Policy Agenda, March 1999, from 
website, http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0399/ijpe/pj19gros.htm. 
  31
'liberal internationalism' was much closer to the prevailing sentiment in the European 
Union, although it was roundly criticized by domestic conservative critics for, among 
other things, its “mania for treaties” and its desire to constrain American hegemony by 
tying “Gulliver with a thousand strings.”68 In the post 9/11 Bush White House, 
however, it seems as though the pendulum has swung the other direction, with the 
ascendancy of the neo-conservatives, a focus on building 'coalitions of the willing,' and 
a more unilateralist, value-centric foreign policy that Krauthammer has dubbed 
'democratic globalism.'69 Eduardo Serra, former Spanish Defense Minister, has labeled  
this the, “transformation...of the US from reluctant sheriff to interventionist global 
superpower.”70 However, it is worth noting here that there are those who see strong 
continuities in the substance, if not the style, of American foreign policy between the 
Clinton and Bush administrations and emphasize that the perceived differences are 
more of the nature of minor, and not revolutionary, adjustments.71  
 Moreover, the Washington consensus in the present administration is that the 
EU has a tendency to emphasize 'multilateralism' at the expense of developing true 
military capabilities in a misguided effort to foster global presence and authority on the 
cheap. In American eyes, the EU, the self-proclaimed 'civilian power,' simply cannot 
exercise 'soft' power without being able to resort to 'hard' power when the situation 
calls for it. While humanitarian aid, international organizations, and confidence 
building measures are all important, the US continues to emphasize the crucial role 
played by military power in resolving conflicts, especially those involving regimes that 
respect neither democracy, human rights, nor the rule of law.72 However much many in 
Washington may deride 'Old Europe' for its military shortcomings, one must keep in 
mind that these shortcomings are merely relative to an American power that exists on a 
scale never before seen, and, outside the US, the member states of the EU comprise 
some of the world's most powerful and capable militaries. Notably, Britain and France 
are both nuclear powers and the only two other nations in the world which can be said 
to have true 'power projection' capabilities, and they, thus, should not be 
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underestimated.73  
 This US-EU distinction between the 'hard' and 'soft' power approaches has been 
rather exacerbated as of late under the Bush administration, particularly over the issue 
of the Iraq War, which many Europeans saw as illegitimate because it lacked 
'international' (i.e. UN) sanction. As Schnabel writes, summing up the Bush 
administration's logic, “Those seeking to rely on the rule of law must have some means 
of enforcing it.”74 Thus, under the current administration, the primary emphasis in 
transatlantic security relations seems to be on fostering the expansion of European 
military capabilities so that they can provide both more for their own defense and for 
greater burden-sharing in future NATO operations. But, above all else, it is crucial for 
the US that the process of European security integration does not lead to any sort of 'de-
coupling' from the primacy of transatlantic security ties and the NATO framework. 
However, as this section has established, the US is also intricately involved in all of the 
main problems which the EU faces in its efforts to bring about an autonomous CFSP-
ESDP.  The three main challenges to the development of the EU's role in European 
security, in short, are: the lack of clear leadership for the project within the EU, the 
shortcomings of European military capabilities, and the issue of the EU's increasing 
institutional overlap with NATO.  The following sections will take a closer look at 
these problems, as well as examining the preferences of the EU members and their 
impact on the evolution of European security. 
 
The United Kingdom 
 
 The United Kingdom, with its long history of the 'special relationship' with the 
United States, is the principal European ally of the United States, and, as a result, 
Britain has a tendency to hew to a more 'Atlanticist' line in European security and 
defense matters than any of the continental European states. Generally, this places the 
British in opposition to the more 'Europeanist' approach of the French, their traditional 
rival for security and defense leadership in Europe, although, as was the case with St. 
Malo, the British and the French have proved that they can work together when the 
stakes are high enough. The US and UK also engage in an unparalleled level of defense 
cooperation including intelligence sharing, joint procurement, military basing, and 
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nuclear weapons assistance and maintenance. For the UK, the primary concern above 
all is to maintain America's commitment to European security and defense through 
NATO and to prevent the taking of any steps towards the development an ESDP which 
could result in an lessened American commitment or withdrawal from Europe. As a 
result, the British favor the primacy of NATO in European defense and oppose the 
development of any European security framework designed to challenge or replace 
NATO's role in Europe.  
 Specifically, Britain has generally preferred a weak ESDI to ensure a lasting 
American commitment to European security, and this has traditionally meant that the 
UK is quite strident in its rejection of any measure designed to bring the WEU and the 
EU CFSP closer together. As the British Ministry of Defense states, “Multinational 
Defense Cooperation should be pursued when it...is compatible with, and does not 
threaten, our links to the US and NATO.”75  In European security and defense matters, 
Britain is a status quo power because, due to its close ties with the US, it benefits more 
than any other European power from the continuation of America's presence in Europe. 
For Britain, the US role in Europe serves as a counterbalancing force against the 
possible re-emergence of Germany or Russia as major powers in the region.76 Britain 
generally tends to pursue a something of a policy of 'bandwagoning' vis à vis the US, in 
an effort to keep the US active and engaged in European security. As Posen writes, 
“Britain is driven more by fear that failure to support the U.S. will further reduce 
Europe’s already slim influence on its policies.”77 
 The experience of European impotence in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, 
coupled with the approval of the ESDI and the 'Berlin-plus' arrangement in the 1994 
and 1996 NATO Summits, moved the British to accept the need for greater EU security 
and defense cooperation and integration. As The Economist put it in 1998, “Mr. Blair is 
conscious that in defense matters, Britain, France, and Germany may have little choice 
but to work together more closely, given America’s recent reluctance to commit any 
more ground troops to Europe’s potential war zones.”78 Thus, America's perceived lack 
of solid commitment to European security forced the British to take on a more 
leadership role in elaborating the EU's security and defense role along the lines it 
desired. In many ways, it was this British decision to take part that made the project 
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viable, as any European defense framework build around France, Germany, and 
Belgium, and lacking the participation of the EU's largest military power, simply 
wouldn't be credible.79  
 With the joint Anglo-French St. Malo Declaration in 1998, the British softened 
their longstanding opposition and agreed to the creation of a joint force to tackle 
'Petersberg tasks,' thus paving the way for the creation of an independent ESDI within 
the EU. In many ways, the creation of the 'Rapid Reaction Force' at St. Malo was an 
effort to prepare for future Bosnia-type situations in which the US would be unwilling 
to participate. Furthermore, British participation at the head of the project also helped 
to reassure the US about the ultimate motivating goals behind the RRF. Since St. Malo, 
however, Britain has staunchly maintained that the primary framework for European 
security and defense should continue to be NATO, and any EU EDSP-creation should 
be largely ancillary and complementary in nature. As the UK Ministry of Defense puts 
it, the key British objective is, “to ensure that NATO and the defense dimension of the 
EU are mutually reinforcing.”80  
 British participation in the European security project is also a means of 'hedging 
its bets' against its possible future development, as the British are loathe to simply hand 
over European military leadership to the more proactively EU-oriented French. 
Particularly in the last decade, the British have significantly surpassed the French in 
military terms, largely on the basis on their  greater defense spending, although recent 
budgetary increases in France have effectively eliminated the spending, if not the 
capability, gap.81 The UK is now keener on the ESDP as a means of increasing its 
power within the EU, balancing against possible French anti-NATO  influence in  EU 
security and defense matters, and enhancing its status in Washington by developing 
greater and more useful military capabilities that could be used within NATO.82 This is 
reason why Britain has been so favorable to the idea of Turkish membership in the EU: 
it sees Turkish inclusion as a way of ensuring that the Union will remain both largely 
oriented around economic integration as well as strongly Atlanticist in its foreign and 
security policy outlook.  
 In any event, the importance of British participation in the future development 
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of the EU ESDP cannot be overestimated. Britain is one of the only two EU-15 
member states, along with France, which has significant global military capabilities, a 
nuclear arsenal, and in which public opinion remains relatively supportive of military 
action, due to its martial legacy as an imperial power.83 While the success and 
credibility of any EU security and defense framework will be dependent on the active 
support and involvement of Europe's strongest military power, the British have 
complex motives and will doubtless continue to be prickly, difficult partners in the 
future. 
  
France 
 
 France, on the other hand, has been the EU's most vocal and long standing 
supporter of the development of an independent European security and defense 
framework. France has traditionally championed a strongly 'Europeanist' approach to 
European security and defense matters that would minimize American and NATO 
leadership and leave more room for France to play a lead role. France effectively 
sidelined itself from playing such a role within NATO with President De Gaulle's 
decision to withdrawal from NATO's integrated command in 1966, and, ever since, 
France has looked to the development of an integrated European security and defense 
framework, outside of NATO, to exert greater influence. For France, the project of 
European integration serves two principal security functions: it lessens the possible 
threat of German resurgence by tying Germany more closely to the European order and 
fosters the development of the EU as a coherent balance to the current American 
hegemony.84 
 With the end of the bipolar era of the Cold War, France no longer has room to 
maneuver in the face of American unipolarity. As the French see it, France is only 
capable of playing a role as an important power in a multipolar world system that 
prioritizes international law, multilateralism, and strong international bodies, such as 
the UN.85 As President Chirac put it, “In an open world, no one can live in isolation, no 
one can act alone in the name of all, and no one can accept the anarchy of a society 
without rules. There is no alternative to the United Nations....Multilateralism is the 
                                                 
83Posen, p.1. 
84Kirchner, p.47. 
85Marcel H. van Herpen, “France: Champion of a Multipolar World,” from website, 
http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol2Issue19/vol2issue19vanherpen.html. 
  36
key.”86  The French particularly tend to emphasize the role of the UN, as the French 
Security Council seat, alongside its nuclear power status, remains one of the country's 
most potent trappings of its former Great Power status. For France, as a nation of 
middling capabilities with grand power ambitions, embracing multilateralism is an 
attempt to reign in and contain the power of the American hyperpuissance by 
subjecting it to international rules, norms, and procedures. However, as the ruckus over 
the Iraq War illustrated, this approach has its shortcomings, for the lack of UN approval 
did nothing to prevent the United States from going to war.    
 The French seek to restore multipolarity to the present system of American 
unipolar domination, and the development of 'Superpower Europe' though the EU is 
their means to that end.  As Kupchan writes, “For France, the EU is more about 
amassing and projecting power, aggregating the Union's military and economic 
resources so that it can assert itself as a global player.”87 While the individual European 
states, even the most powerful among them, are no longer capable of rivaling American 
hegemony on the global stage, the 25 member states of the EU acting together represent 
a formidable economic and (potential) military powerhouse. However, for Europe and 
France to have real influence in world affairs, the French firmly believe in the need to 
enhance European military capabilities: words must be backed up with means. France 
is thus a strong supporter of the ESDP and programs relating to joint military 
procurement, as they will allow the EU to develop its military capabilities more 
effectively and efficiently. 
 France was one of the original six members of what would become the EU, and 
French bureaucrats and statesmen, such as Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, played a 
crucial role in the development of the European project. France prioritized European 
integration in the 1950s and 60s, when it faced the loss of its colonial empire, as a 
means to reassert French power and international standing. While France, working in 
concert with an acquiescent Germany, was effectively able to run the project of 
European integration on its own terms for a number of years, expansion of the EU over 
time has led to a lessening of French power within the organization. While Germany 
remains the clear economic and industrial European power, France's leadership role in 
Europe has traditionally been based in part on its military power.88 However, this 
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power is waning. Rough Franco-British military parity has been overturned in the last 
decade as French defense spending waned, with the result that now, “Great Britain now 
sets the standard within Europe for military efficiency and deployability and is a 
standard of reference within French defense circles.”89 The Chirac government has 
taken steps in the last several years to close the capability gap with increased defense 
spending under the Loi de Programmation Militaire (LPM).90  
 While the French do not seek to replace NATO with the development of the 
ESDP, or at least not yet, they do seek a rebalancing in the transatlantic relationship on 
the basis of greater European leadership and capabilities.91 However, many in Europe, 
most especially the British, fear the French ultimately seek  to replace NATO with a 
new European security and defense framework and remove the US from the Continent. 
This deep-seated distrust has led to a continuous jockeying for primacy between Britain 
and France in the battle to define the terms of the EU's ESDP. While the French and the 
British did come together in defense matters on a certain level with the St. Malo 
Declaration in 1998, the rift caused by the Iraq War seems to have made Franco-British 
cooperation a more tenuous process as of late, as it has made the two nations differing 
preferences explicit and visible.92  
 Accordingly, France has sought to exclude Britain by looking to reconstitute the 
original six founding EU members around closer security integration under French 
leadership.93 France held a 'mini-summit' in April 2003 with Belgium, Luxembourg, 
and Germany to discuss, among other things, the creation of an independent EU 
planning and operations headquarters at Tervuren, in a seeming challenge to the 
planning structures of NATO's Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). 
While the proposal in and of itself is not earth-shattering, it remains politically 
important as a signal that there are those in Europe who seek to revive the idea of an 
independent European military at the expense of a NATO divided over the Iraq War.94 
As Champion notes, “it is an idea regarded in London and Washington as a small but 
symbolic step towards the rupturing of NATO,” to which the US ambassador to the 
NATO alliance has added, “'Tervuren is a symbol of competition' between the EU and 
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NATO.”95 It is worth noting, however, that only four powers showed up to the 'mini-
summit,' indicating a certain level of mistrust and opposition to French plans. In the 
end, while such French measures may advance security cooperation and integration 
between the 'Gang of Four,' they also run the long-term risk of further dividing the EU-
25 by alienating 'Atlanticists' in the Union and rendering the establishment of a unified 
ESDP that much more difficult.      
 The French vision for the EU and the ESDP is one centered around 
conglomeration as a means to rectify Europe's waning power in the face of  the 
vicissitudes of history. As Kupchan writes, “The EU is to do for Europe what the nation 
state is no longer strong enough to do for France.”96 However, in an expanded EU-25, 
many of the new Eastern member states, with strong ties to the US and NATO, do not 
share France's vision of a 'Superpower Europe' in competition with America. Although 
France has recently tried to circumvent this by reconstituting 'core' Europe for security 
integration, the efforts have met with mixed success and a fair share of controversy. 
While French leadership has proved important in the development of the EU's ESDP as 
it stands today, it alone is no longer sufficient in the EU-25: France must learn to adapt 
itself, and its long-term goals, to the realities of the EU today.   
  
Germany 
 
 Germany, for historical, political, and constitutional reasons, represents 
something of a unique case among the EU member states. Due to its military 
aggression in World Wars I and II,  its period of rule by Hitler and the Nazi party, and 
it involvement in the greatest atrocity of the twentieth century, the Holocaust, Germany 
retains singular historical, moral, and emotional 'baggage'. It is the country that by all 
rights, as the world's third largest economy and the Continent's great industrial 
powerhouse, should be the dominant power in Europe, and, yet, it is also the country 
keenest to bind itself to the Western democratic community and prevent itself from 
ever again becoming a threat to regional stability.97 With an eye to this end, the German 
Basic Law of 1949 expressly bans military aggression, stating, “Acts tending to and 
undertaken with intent to disturb the peaceful relations between nations, especially to 
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prepare for a war of aggression, shall be unconstitutional.”98 The two major pillars of 
German security policy since 1945 were about-face reactions to the lessons of pre-1945 
German history: refraining from the use of military force and instinctive 
multilateralism.99  
 Safeguarding Western Europe by tying Germany to its neighbors through a web 
of economic interdependency, especially in heavy industries linked to military 
production, was one of the primary motives for early European integration through the 
European Coal and Steel Community. But the ECSC was not simply an approach 
agreed upon in Paris and imposed on the Germans. The German Republic was 
effectively committed to a 'Europeanist' approach from its creation and, working in 
close collaboration with the French in the so-called 'Paris-Berlin axis,' Germany has 
been a primary driving force in the process of European integration up until the present. 
In fact, the idea that Germany should work towards European integration to enhance 
European stability is even included in the very foundational document of the modern 
German Republic, the Basic Law of 1949.100  Thus, Germany played something of a 
unique role as both a motive and primary mover for European integration in the 
aftermath of WWII.  
 Due to the 'liberation' of Eastern Germany by the Soviet Red Army at the end of 
World War II, Germany was divided during the Cold War into the Communist-
controlled East, the 'German Democratic Republic,' and the NATO-allied West, the 
'Federal Republic of Germany.' During the Cold War, Germany was heavily reliant on 
NATO and American collective security guarantees, as it was on the front lines of the 
East-West showdown. As might be expected, Germany was one of NATO's staunchest 
supporters during the Cold War, happily hosting the largest American military force in 
Europe. Although, following the fall of the Berlin Wall, East and West Germany were 
formally reunited in October 1990, Germany was profoundly shaped by its past as the 
only EU-15 member state to have (partially) experienced Soviet rule during the Cold 
War. Germany has been strongly supportive of expanding both the NATO and EU to 
include the formerly Communist Warsaw Pact nations of Central and Eastern Europe, 
in the hopes of extending, “to the nations of Central and Eastern Europe the opportunity 
to achieve integration in the Western Alliance, thereby gaining the security and stability 
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that supports political and economic development.”101  
 While it remains constitutionally hampered and militarily underdeveloped 
compared to its economic and industrial strength, Germany possesses Europe's third 
largest military and its involvement is crucial to the success and credibility of any 
project for European security and defense. At present levels, German annual defense 
spending amounts to only about seventy percent of Britain and France, and this 
disparity institutionalizes their capabilities gap.102 Germany, unlike Britain and France, 
is not nor wishes to be a nuclear power, it remains and will continue to remain 
dependent on the American 'nuclear umbrella' for protection for the foreseeable future. 
Despite this, however, in the aftermath of the Cold War and the end of the direct Soviet 
threat to its territorial integrity, Germany is beginning to take on a more active role in 
international affairs commensurate with its economic importance, evident, for example, 
in Chancellor Schröder's strong opposition to the Iraq War and the German bid for a 
permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Germany has quickly come to realize, 
however, that involvement in security matters is a necessary precursor to greater 
geopolitical clout.103  
  German strategic military planning was re-evaluated in 2002 to prioritize 
international crisis management and make room for German participation in 'out of 
area' Petersberg task missions, as has been evident in German participation in 
operations ranging from SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina to ISAF in Afghanistan.104 The 
2003 Defense Policy Guidelines further transformed German security policy by 
stressing that the need for globally deployable rapid response units prepared for a full 
range of tasks (including 'high-intensity operations') was paramount to national security 
and should shape the capabilities and orientation of the German military.105 In other 
words, Germany is effectively reshaping its military to suit the uncertainties of the 
post-Cold War world and the requirements of the Petersberg task missions envisioned 
by the EU. These strategic re-evaluations enabled German military capabilities to be 
used for foreign policy goals, not just territorial defense and deterrence, and has 
brought German security and defense policy more in line with the other EU major 
powers.  
 Germany's attitude towards questions of European security and defense has 
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traditionally fallen somewhere in the middle of the British-French spectrum, favoring a 
stronger, more balanced, and more 'Europeanized' NATO and the development of an 
independent European military capability to work in cooperation, not competition, with 
NATO.106 As Schröder said in 2004, “A strong NATO needs a strong European base. 
As such, we want to actively use and strengthen the strategic partnership that exists 
between NATO and the European Union.”107 That being said, while Germany was one 
of the staunchest supporters of NATO during the Cold War, as of late, especially under 
the Social Democrats, it has drifted further from NATO. Germany, alongside EU 
featherweights Belgium and Luxembourg, has embraced the French concept of closer 
defense integration of 'core' EU countries, which, given France's significantly larger 
military capabilities, effectively means acquiescing to French military leadership in the 
project. This shift was evident in the German decision to join the French-led 'mini-
defense summit' in Brussels in 2003. 
 Thus, while the German Republic is seeking to develop its military capabilities 
in line with the ESDP to contribute more to European security and defense and thereby 
play a greater geopolitical role more commensurate with its economic power, it is not 
as of yet playing a true leadership role in defining the European security and defense 
agenda. For the present it seems more comfortable tipping the UK-France leadership 
scales towards France and following the French lead in European security and defense 
integration. While this may have more to do with domestic budgetary constraints and a 
lack of desire to commit to the large defense spending increases that would be 
necessary to challenge French or British military leadership in Europe, the decision is 
not without consequences. As Boes writes, “If this is designed to escape from the 
overbearing power of the United States, it might turn out that Germany in fact has just 
exchanged one hegemony for the other.”108       
 
Italy 
 
 Italy is Europe's fourth largest military power and is the last EU member states 
that can be said to possess significant military capabilities. Italian Annual defense 
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spending of $27.8bn in 2004 comprises some 13.5% of the total EU-25 spending on 
defense, compared to 23% for the UK, 22.5% for France, and 16.5% for Germany.109 
While it does not possess either power projection capabilities or a nuclear arsenal, 
Italy's military has proved itself to be capable of making significant contributions to 
European security and even initiating and leading independent missions, as it did in 
Operation Alba in Albania in the spring of 1997. Italian security policy since 1945 has 
been based on two pillars: the US as the guarantor of security and involvement in 
emerging European institutions.  
 During the Cold War, Italy, as a beneficiary of the American 'nuclear umbrella,' 
was a strong supporter of NATO and closely aligned to US positions of matters of 
defense and security policy.110 In the aftermath of the Cold War, with the rise of new 
security challenges, however, Italy, has begun to assert a more independent foreign and 
security policy based on addressing its national interests. Primary among these interests 
is enhancing cooperation between the EU, NATO, and the UN.  As Croci puts it, 
“Italy’s national security interest is no longer passively and vaguely defined by 
membership in these organizations but has come to be identified with the very pursuit 
of...policies that aim at reinforcing and functionally linking [them].”111 Thus, for 
example, while Italy supports an increased NATO role in 'out of area' missions in crisis 
management and the like, it places significant importance on deriving legitimization for 
such missions from the UN.112 However, preferences aside, this has not stopped Italy 
from participating in missions that lack UN approval, such as the NATO campaign in 
Kosovo or in post-conflict security in Iraq.  
 In the absence of the Soviet threat, Italy is now more focused on security 
challenges that may arise in its own neighborhood, principally from local and regional 
conflicts in the Balkans and North Africa, refugees and migration, and Middle Eastern 
terrorism. As Croci writes, “The Italian peninsula represents, in fact, the closest and 
most porous, and hence the favorite, point of access into Europe by political refugees 
and economic migrants as well as Islamic terrorists.”113 While these are all challenges 
that effect Europe as a whole, they are ones that threaten Italy, due to its geography, 
much more directly. Consequently, Italy has explicitly supported the enhancement of 
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the Mediterranean dimension of the EU's Neighborhood Policy, in line with the 
numerous potential security challenges for the EU which emanate from the region.114 
Italy has also been a supporter of both EU and NATO expansion, but seeks to lessen 
the gap in membership between the two organizations through slower expansion in 
unison. Italy is concerned that eastward expansion will run the risk of shifting the 
center of gravity of the organizations north and eastwards, further away from Italy and 
the Southern Mediterranean region. 
 Italy has historically tended to be closer to the British pole of the European 
security spectrum and is generally moderately Atlanticist in outlook. The Berlusconi 
government has maintained a particularly strong pro-American stance and has been an 
important US ally, most notably, in the Iraq War, to which Italy contributed 2800 
troops to post-conflict security. As Comelli notes, “in some important cases the Italian 
government and, in particular, the Prime Minister Berlusconi has preferred the 
relationship with the Unites States to other traditional European partners, such as 
France and Germany.”115 However, Italy has also been supportive of efforts to develop 
the EU's CFSP and ESDP, provided that they are clearly and completely designed to be 
complementary to the strengthening of NATO. Italy is opposed to any effort to develop 
the CFSP/ESDP as an alternative to NATO, due to, as Croci writes, “the fear that it 
might be excluded (as it has often happened) from a kind of French-English-German 
'security directoire’ that might be formed and take the lead in security matters, should 
ESDP ever emancipate from NATO.”116 NATO primacy remains a guarantee of Italian 
participation in major matters of European security and defense. Thus, while Italy is 
committed to the development of the CFSP/ESDP, it will only participate on its own 
terms to ensure that it is not a neo-Gaullist project to replace NATO in Europe and 
minimize Italy's voice.     
  
Denmark 
 
 Denmark is an interesting and exceptional case within the EU in matters of 
security and defense. Although it is not a neutral state, and is a full member of NATO, 
Denmark has decided to opt-out of all EU defense matters, including the CFSP and the 
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ESDP. Denmark was among the most devoted Atlanticists within NATO during the 
Cold War, and it continues to see NATO as the key and sole actor in maintaining 
collective defense guarantees in Europe. The Danish vision of the European Union is 
one based solely around economic integration, rejecting political and security and 
defense elements, and certainly without any aspirations of 'Superpower Europe.' The 
CFSP is perceived by many in Denmark as a policy driven by the major European 
power and characteristic of great power foreign policy, and, consequently, they want no 
part in it.117 Denmark has traditionally opposed the use of military force in foreign 
policy outside of national defense and peacekeeping, which should take place through 
either NATO or the UN.  In recent years, however, Denmark has become increasing 
comfortable with possible cooperation and participation with the EU in broader 
Petersberg task missions.118 For the foreseeable future, however, despite the potential 
for limited security cooperation with the EU in Petersberg tasks, Denmark will remain 
largely sidelined from European security and defense due to its opt-out.  
 
The Netherlands 
 
 The Netherlands is a medium sized European state centrally located between the 
major European powers of France, Germany, and the UK, and, accordingly, it tends to 
favor multilateralism and the rule of law to protect its interests. Accordingly, it has 
been strongly favorable to the project of further European integration and was one of 
the original six founding members of the EU. The Dutch tend to fall somewhere in the 
middle of the European security spectrum, seeking to both expand the role of the EU in 
security, but not at the expense of the NATO Alliance.  The Dutch have been strong 
proponents of developing the ESDP, which they see as a means to enhance the EU's 
contribution to transatlantic cooperation and bring more balance to the Alliance.119 The 
Dutch are engaged in a number of multinational cooperative military efforts within the 
EU, primarily working with the UK, Germany, and Belgium, most notably in the joint 
UK/NL Amphibious Landing Force.  
 However, as a nation with limited military resources, security policy in the 
Netherlands still relies primarily on its membership in NATO, which both provides a 
                                                 
117Henrik Larsen, “Denmark and the EU's defense dimension: Opt-out across the board?,” from website, 
http://www.ecsa.dk/larsen.pdf 
118Larsen, p.5. 
119The Netherlands Ministry of Defense, “Facts and figures on Dutch security policy and armed forces,” 
MOD Office of Information, July 2004, p.9. 
  45
defense guarantee and ensures Dutch participation in security and defense decisions. 
Over security and defense, as well as economic, matters, the Dutch have found 
themselves increasing in opposition to the EU in recent years120, and the Dutch reacted 
in horror to the 'mini-defense summit' in Brussels in 2003, whose proposals provoked 
the Foreign Minister to declare that he, “cannot imagine a world order built against the 
United States.”121  While the Netherlands favors the further development of the ESDP, 
it seeks to do so to restore more parity to the Alliance, not undermine it.  
 
Belgium and Luxembourg 
 
 Belgium and Luxembourg are both original founding members of the EU and 
close to the French in their strong 'Europeanist' outlook. Furthermore, both nations host 
major EU institutions within their borders. As they are small states with extremely 
limited military capabilities located in the center of Europe between the major 
European powers of France and Germany, they seek to ensure their security through 
EU multilateralism and peaceful integration. This orientation extends to the EU's CFSP 
and ESDP, which they both strongly support and where both nations have tended to 
follow the French lead. Both countries participated in the 'mini-defense summit' with 
France and Germany in Brussels in 2003 and have pushed for closer European security 
and defense integration.  That being said, while Belgium's military is small, 
Luxembourg's is virtually non-existent, and they will add little, if anything, to overall 
EU capabilities. While both countries are generally supportive of NATO and the 
transatlantic partnership, they don't believe that it should impede the development of 
the ESDP or imply any degree of US dominance of their foreign and security policy.122 
Despite their strong 'Europeanist' support for the CFSP/ESDP, neither one of these 
countries will have much impact on the overall tenor of the debate on European 
security and defense.  
 
The 'Neutral' States: Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Ireland 
 
 From its rebirth as an independent and sovereign Republic in 1955, following a 
period of occupation by the Allied Powers at the end of WWII, permanent neutrality 
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has formed the cornerstone of Austrian foreign policy, although this has been revised 
somewhat in recent years. Austria began cooperating with NATO in 1995, through the 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, and has left the door open to possible future full 
NATO membership. Austria also strongly supports both NATO enlargement in its own 
region of Central and Eastern Europe and continued EU-NATO close cooperation. 
Moreover, with the Constitutional reforms of 1998, Austrian security policy has shifted 
from a focus on autonomous national security to one of “European solidarity.”123 This 
means that Austria is now legally able contribute to Petersberg tasks in crisis 
prevention and management in support of the CFSP and ESDP, and it has in fact done 
so in all EU crisis management missions in Bosnia, the DRC, and FYROM. The 
Austrian government is supportive of efforts to further develop common European 
security and defense.124 Austria seems to have accommodated its constitutional 
neutrality to allow it to participate in the EU's ESDP and CFSP and it should prove a 
useful, if smallish, contributor to Union security efforts.  
 Due to its geographical proximity, Finland fell into the Soviet orbit during the 
Cold War and was pressured into signing the 1948 Agreement of Friendship, 
Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with the USSR, which stipulated that Finland was 
obliged to militarily oppose any attack on itself or the USSR by Germany and her 
allies. During the Cold War, Finland, always mindful of the Soviet threat lingering next 
door, was committed to a policy of strict neutrality. Finland abolished its policy of 
neutrality in the aftermath of the Cold War and has instead shifted to a policy of 
military non-alliance and self-sufficient national defense.125 Although it is not a 
member of NATO, in the post-Cold War era Finland has cooperated with NATO 
through the PfP program and leaves the possibility of future membership on the table. 
Since joining the EU in 1995, Finland has had reservations about the development of 
the CFSP/ESDP, as it favors a broad consensus on security and defense matters 
involving all member states, not just the 'core' states or major powers.126 Furthermore, 
any CFSP/ESDP framework that the EU develops must be manageable within the 
confines of Finnish policy of military non-alignment. That being said, Finland is keen 
to cooperate with the EU on matters related to crisis prevention and management, and, 
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on the whole, despite its restrictions, Finland should be able to make some sort of 
contribution to the Union's security efforts.  
 Sweden, much like Finland, maintained a neutral stance during the Cold War, 
due to its relative geographical proximity to the Soviet Union. While Sweden still 
maintains a policy of non-participation in military alliances, it modified its stance 
somewhat in 2002 by authorizing cooperation with other states against threats to peace 
and security. Unlike some of the other neutral or non-aligned states, Sweden has a 
relatively high level of defense spending and has notable military capabilities. 
Although they have begun cooperating with NATO in recent years through the PfP 
program, the Swedes believe that NATO will become less important for them as the EU 
develops its security dimension.127 Accordingly, Sweden actively supports the 
development of the CFSP/ESDP, and has a particular desire to see the EU take on a 
greater global role in international crisis prevention and management, working either 
independently or in conjunction with NATO.128 Sweden sees effective and productive 
multilateral cooperation in this area as central to its security policy. While maintaining 
its policy of non-participation in alliances, Sweden strongly supports the development 
of the ESDP/CFSP, which will allow the EU to play a bigger role in resolving 
contemporary global challenges. 
 Since its independence from the UK in 1922, Ireland has maintained a policy of 
'neutrality' in name, which is, in truth, guided more by the idea of non-participation in 
alliances. Ireland supports the development of the ESDP/CFSP with caveats and may 
participate in their military operations if the so-called 'triple lock'- the government, the 
parliament, and the UNSC- authorize the action.129 However, Irish participation is also 
bounded by its relatively small military capabilities. Although Ireland has begun to 
cooperate recently with NATO through the PfP program, this remains controversial 
among much of the Irish public and Irish NATO membership seems highly unlikely for 
the present. Further, the Irish do not seek to develop the EU as a counterbalance to the 
US, as Ireland has strong ties to America and the Irish public finds playing international 
'power politics' of this sort distasteful.130 However, through the process of 
'Europeanization,' Irish policy-makers have started to  view security, defense, and 
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foreign policy issues in a broader European context and they seek to address 
international security issues primarily through conflict resolution, including 
peacekeeping, and development cooperation.131 Provided that the 'triple lock' supports a 
given operation, Irish 'neutrality' seems compatible with involvement in the 
CFSP/ESDP and Ireland can make some sort of a contribution to European security 
through this framework.  
 
The Mediterranean States: Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Cyprus 
 
 Greece, an EU member since 1981, is one of the leading 'Europeanist' 
proponents of further EU integration, and it is especially supportive of efforts to 
develop both the CFSP and the ESDP. Greece, like Spain and Portugal, as one of the 
later, poorer members to join the EU, has been a major beneficiary of EU Structural 
Funds, which have helped boost Greek economic development, as well as Greek public 
support for the EU. Despite its status as something of a middleweight European nation, 
Greece maintains comparatively high levels of defense spending for an EU member 
state, largely due to its perception of regional threats. To the north of Greece are a 
number of former Communist states that have had significant periods of instability in 
the post-Cold War period (Albania, FYROM, etc). More importantly, perhaps, is 
Greece's continuous 'on again, off again' tension with its much larger eastern neighbor, 
Turkey, over issues ranging from national minorities and Cyprus to claims over Aegean 
islands.  
 Despite fifty years of membership in NATO, Greece, and particularly Greek 
public opinion, remains wary of NATO, and the Iraq War did nothing but exacerbate 
this feeling. Further, the Greeks favor closer EU defense integration and a more 
European forum for addressing security and defense matters within the EU.132 The 
Greek government is supportive of Petersberg tasks and crisis management operations, 
but believes that the EU should focus these efforts closer to home, especially in the 
Balkan, Caucasus, and Mediterranean regions on Europe's (and Greece's) periphery.133 
While Greece is not a major military player within the EU, its strong support for the 
CFSP and the ESDP and its focus on furthering defense integration ensure that it will 
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certainly have a  role to play in the future of European security. 
 Following the death of its long-time military dictator, General Franco, in 1975, 
Spain moved rapidly to rejoin Western Europe, becoming a member of NATO in 1982 
and of the EU in 1986. While not one of the major European military powers, Spain 
possesses the EU's fifth most capable military and can be considered as a significant 
secondary military actor in Europe. Spain has traditionally been strongly in favor of 
European integration, as EU Structural Funds have helped the country develop 
economically over the past twenty years. Spain, regardless of which government is in 
power, has also traditionally been quite supportive of the efforts to develop both the 
ESDP and the CFSP and seeks to turn them into a real, tangible European defense 
policy. At the same time, however, Spain remains somewhat wary of always playing 
'second string' to the larger EU powers and favors developing European foreign and 
security policy in such a way that Spain can play a greater, and possibly even a leading, 
role.134 Prior to 1996, Spain had a generally Europeanist outlook in foreign policy and 
had primarily worked in conjunction with the EU's driving Franco-German axis.  
 However, with the election of Jose Maria Aznar and his center-right People's 
Party in 1996, Spain's foreign policy outlook took a decided shift towards the Atlantic. 
Aznar quickly reoriented Spanish foreign policy along much more Atlanticist lines, 
shifting away from the Paris-Berlin axis and towards Britain, the new member states in 
Central and Eastern Europe, and, most of all, the United States. In his two terms, Aznar 
moved to establish a privileged bilateral relationship with the US, cultivated a more 
distant attitude towards the EU and integration, focused on the fight against terrorism, 
and, most controversially, provided support to the US War in Iraq.135 However, 
everything shifted yet again in 2004, with the victory of the Socialist Party and Jose 
Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, which saw a 'return to Europe' and a re-embrace of the 
Franco-German axis in foreign policy. Zapatero also immediately withdrew Spanish 
forces from Iraq and re-prioritized the EU as Spain's major foreign policy focus.136 
Thus, for the present at least, it seems as though Spain has again turned its focus back 
to Europe and is on track to make a significant contribution to European security. 
 As a small state on the periphery of the European Continent, Portugal has 
traditionally been very supportive of the project of European integration, including, as 
of late, the areas of common security, defense, and foreign policy. While the 
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Portuguese government was originally against the creation of a European security and 
defense dimension, the operationalization of the 'Berlin-plus' arrangement in the mid 
1990s resulted in a framework which allows the Portuguese government to support 
European security development without competing with NATO.137 The CFSP and 
ESDP serve Portuguese interests by increasing the international importance of 
Portuguese foreign policy and diplomacy and by addressing many of the key 
Portuguese foreign policy concerns in its areas of interest, such as Latin America, the 
Mediterranean, East Timor, and Africa.138 Portugal is moderately Atlanticist in that, 
while it supports the ESDP, it seeks to develop it complementarity to NATO and to 
preserve the transatlantic ties. In this vein, the Portuguese government offered political 
support for the US War in Iraq not out of any particular conviction but to ensure strong 
long-term US ties to European security.139 Portugal is somewhat opposed to further 
expansion of the EU as it runs the risk of lessening the voice that small states, such as 
Portugal, have within the Union. Portugal seeks a middle of the road Atlanticist 
strategy to maximize its foreign and security policy influence within the EU through 
the CFSP and ESDP, while maintaining its voice, and transatlantic security guarantees, 
with NATO. 
 The Republic of Cyprus, one of the ten candidate countries which accessed to 
the EU in May of 2004, is not a member of NATO and has traditionally maintained a 
non-aligned foreign policy, as well as close ties with its fellow Greeks in Greece. Due 
to its location in the eastern Mediterranean and its proximity to the Middle East, Cyprus 
has a strong interest in seeing the EU renew the Barcelona process and take on a greater 
role in Middle Eastern affairs. While it is a strong supporter of the CFSP-ESDP process 
and of the Union taking on a larger role in international affairs, Cyprus, as a small state, 
is also keen to ensure that the EU will ensure the equal  participation of all members 
states, big and small, as the CFSP-ESDP develops.140  Most significantly, of course, 
since 1974, Cyprus has experienced an ongoing territorial dispute with Turkey and the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which occupies roughly the northern third of the 
island. Despite decades of negotiations and numerous referendums and proposed 
solutions, the dispute has not been resolved and only the Republic of Cyprus portion of 
the still-divided island of Cyprus was admitted to the EU as a member state in 2004. 
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However, in order to placate Turkish fears about its exclusion from the EU's security 
arrangements, an agreement on asset-sharing was reached between NATO and the EU 
in Copenhagen in December of 2002 which excludes Cyprus from participation in EU-
led operations that make use of NATO assets. Somewhat understandably, Cyprus, 
despite its minimal military capabilities, has been nevertheless somewhat resentful of 
this exclusion. Due to this situation, the Cypriot contribution to the EU's ESDP will 
remain modest at best.  
 
The Former Warsaw Pact States 
 
 Despite their cultural, geographical, economic, and political differences, the 
eight former Warsaw Pact Central and Eastern European states,141 that joined the EU in 
May of 2004 are a remarkably homogeneous lot when it comes to their security and 
defense policy preferences. At the time of their accession to the EU, all eight were 
members of NATO, with the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland having joined in 
May of 1999 and the other five, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, in 
March of 2004. Having suffered through decades of Russian domination (with the 
exception of Slovenia, which, as part of Yugoslavia, was non-aligned with Moscow), 
all eight states are highly Atlanticist in outlook and strongly supportive of close ties to 
both NATO and the United States.142 NATO membership and its Article V guarantee of 
collective defense remains the cornerstone of security policy for all eight. The former 
Communist states are all committed to the long-term maintenance of an American 
security role in Europe as a balance against threats from a resurgent Russia. On the 
basis of their experience of occupation during the Cold War, this is a threat that they 
feel the EU naively underestimates.143  
 While they have all more or less come around to the idea of the ESDP and a 
greater European dimension to their security policies, they are nonetheless vigorous in 
their insistence that it should neither duplicate NATO assets nor try to 'balance' against 
US hegemony. These states see the role of the ESDP as a value-adding complement to 
NATO that will be largely concerned with Petersberg tasks in situations where NATO 
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itself is not involved. In envisioning these Petersberg crisis management situations, the 
eight, however, have a more localized geographical role in mind, with a focus on 
Eastern Europe (especially Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova), the Caucasus, and the 
Balkans.144 Thus, while the eight former Warsaw Pact members have now mostly come 
around to supporting the idea of developing the ESDP as an independent European 
security capability, they will only do so on their own strictly Atlanticist and pro-NATO 
terms. These new eight member states are opinionated and numerous, and their 
accession may well represent a major turning point in the ongoing debate over 
European security within the EU.  
   
The Debate Over the Iraq War 
 
 The lead-up to the War in Iraq in 2003 was a rather traumatic time for those 
who have sought to develop an 'ever closer' foreign and security policy consensus in the 
EU, as the fierce divide between those who supported and those who opposed the US-
led war presented a stiff challenge to European unity. However, as it also made the 
different EU member states and then-candidate country's security preferences explicit 
and visible, it is worth taking a closer look at the debate to gain a better understanding 
of the underlying rift in Europe over matters of security policy.   
In the diplomatic battle which raged in the United Nations, the US, and the EU, sharp 
battle lines were drawn between the Union's more Atlanticist and Europeanist 
members. Interestingly also, the Iraq War revealed a potential new shift in the balance 
within the EU with strong future consequences, as all of the then-soon-to-join Central 
and Eastern European candidate countries sided with the US over the War.   
 However, at the end of the day, as usual, it primarily came down to a struggle 
between the EU's two major diplomatic and military powers, Britain and France. As 
The Economist writes, “'This is as much a crisis within Europe as it is between Europe 
and the U.S.," says Timothy Garton Ash, a professor of history at St. Antony's College, 
Oxford. "There is a struggle going on for Europe's soul between Atlanticists and 
Gaullists.'”145 In the lead-up to the War, Britain remained closely allied to the American 
efforts, attempting to influence US policy through its strong support and by acting as a 
sort of intermediary between the US and Europe. It helped to convince the US to take 
its case to the United Nations, in a bid to obtain the sanction of the Security Council 
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before going to war, and when that failed, despite domestic public opinion opposition 
to the war, Tony Blair committed the largest non-American contingent to the US-led 
coalition in the Iraq War. 
 In supporting the US policy on Iraq, Britain lined up alongside the other NATO 
member signatories of the so-called 'Letter of Eight,' including Denmark, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the UK. Not to be outdone, the 
Central and Eastern European nations responded with their own 'Letter of Ten,' with 
Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, 
and Slovenia also signaling their support for US policy. US Secretary of Defense, 
Donald Rumsfeld, famously replied to a reporter's question during a press conference 
about European opposition to the War in Iraq by stating, "'You're thinking of Europe as 
Germany and France. I don't. I think that's old Europe.'" He then went on to add that 
those countries enumerated above, which had all actively supported the US War in Iraq, 
were in fact, “New Europe.”146 Whether it was an intentional slight or simply more of a 
lapsus lingua, Rumsfeld had drawn a new line in the sand across the Continent between 
those that the US saw as trusted allies and worthwhile partners, and those that it saw as 
nothing more than trifling obstructionists intent on opposing American leadership.  
 In the struggle over the Iraq War, France, as The Economist explains, “has tried 
to use the U.N. as a means to restrain America's freedom to act as it wishes. It has tried, 
too, to unite Europe as a counterbalance to U.S. power.”147 In its bid to curb the 
American effort in the UNSC, France fostered a new Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis to act 
as a sort of multipolar troika in balancing the American hegemony. As The Economist 
put it, “[Chirac] undoubtedly sees Russia as one of those poles, a point that became 
evident during the Iraq crisis, when French, German, and Russian leaders staged joint 
press conferences to oppose the war.”148 This new troika also served to confirm the 
worst American fears about the ultimate goals of the EU's CFSP-ESDP project as a 
thinly veiled effort to compete with the US across the spectrum and oppose American 
and NATO leadership.149 Further, French President Jacques Chirac voiced his 
displeasure over the potential within the EU for increased future support for the US 
when he told a number of the Central and Eastern European EU candidate countries 
which voiced strong support for the US-led War in Iraq that they, “had missed a good 
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opportunity to shut up.”150 He further scolded them, adding that they, “ have been not 
very well behaved and rather reckless of the danger of aligning themselves too rapidly 
with the American position.”151  
 Absurd as these comments may seem, they reflect the growing unease of the 
EU's Europeanists, who have traditionally steered the European project, with an EU 
that has grown beyond their ability to control. This feeling was particularly acute for 
Europeanists in an EU about to expand to 25 members, rendering the already tenuous 
balance between Atlanticists and Europeanists within the Union ever more precarious. 
Furthermore, another indication of the extent of Atlanticist-Europeanist rift in Europe 
was on display when, as one of the first measures undertaken after he won office in 
2004 from Jose Maria Aznar, Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero removed his country's 
troops from Iraq, thereby underscoring his administrations shift away from an 
Atlanticist and towards a more Europeanist approach in foreign policy. For better or for 
worse, the rift within Europe over the Iraq War has taken on a symbolic value that 
transcends the debate over the merits of the War itself, as it serves as yet another battle 
in the ongoing struggle for Europe's political orientation in world affairs.  
 As the sections above have duly illustrated, the ongoing debate over European 
security within the EU is a complex and challenging one because it serves as a catalytic 
point of contention between states with fundamentally different visions for Europe. The 
battle rages on, as ever, between those polar opposites of Europe, the Atlanticist British 
and the Europeanist French, with the rest of Europe stuck closer, further, or just 
somewhere in the middle. While the driving leadership of the Franco-Germany axis has 
been able to accomplish much in the past, the recent tumult over the Iraq War revealed 
the underlying fault lines that still divide the EU. As Quaisser and Wood recently 
pointed out, one of the biggest threats to the EU in its bid to take on a global role, “may 
be its tendency to fracture over big foreign- policy issues, creating paralysis. That 
happened when Yugoslavia disintegrated into war in the 1990s and again over the U.S.-
led invasion of Iraq in 2003.”152  
 Furthermore, with the EU's eastern expansion in 2004, and the accession of 
eight strongly Atlanticist and pro-NATO nations, the debate has become all the further 
complicated. Whether these new member states will become Europeanized over time 
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and shift their security and defense loyalties from the United States to the EU, or not, is 
something that remains to be seen. Regardless of the outcome, however, the eastward 
expansion of the EU will have profound and lasting consequences for the Union and its 
emerging project in security and defense. While the battles royale that rage in Europe 
over security and defense are complex and confusing, they are certainly never boring to 
observe. The fate of the world may no longer hang in the balance of Europe's struggles 
as it once did, but the outcome will certainly reverberate far beyond the shores of 
Europe.         
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CHAPTER 4: TURKEY’S POTENTIAL ROLE IN THE EU’S ESDP 
 
 This chapter will provide an overview of the potential impact of Turkish 
accession on the EU’s ‘hard’ security power capabilities. This will entail a 
consideration of both the security costs and benefits of Turkish inclusion in the ESDP. 
It will place Turkey in the context of the post-Cold War debate on European security 
and highlight the challenges involved in the transition from the WEU to the ESDP, as 
well as the complex bargaining process over the question of NATO-EU asset sharing. 
Analyzing Turkey's security contributions, with an emphasis on Turkey's Cold War-era 
contribution to European security in NATO, its geostrategically important position, and 
its significant military capabilities, the section will also point out the possible future 
security challenges implicit in Turkish inclusion. Principally, however, the chapter will 
make the argument that, with the development of the ESDP concept and the EU's 
efforts to bridge the gap between its role as an economic 'giant' and a political 
'dwarf,'153 Europe has gradually begun to appreciate the strategic contribution of 
Turkey once again. Finally, it will end by concluding that the Turkey would provide a 
number of important contributions to the power capabilities of the EU's emerging 
ESDP framework, although, at the same time, it would also entail significant new risks 
and challenges for European security. 
 While it is worth pausing to note that the EU has placed an increasingly 
important emphasis on its role as a multifaceted security and foreign policy actor, and 
particularly on its ‘soft’ security focus, this paper will treat the question of the impact 
of Turkish inclusion on the ESDP through a more ‘hard’ security lens, with a focus on 
the EU’s crude power capabilities. The distinction between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ security is 
an important one, especially as of late, and it is difficult to truly separate the two often 
interlinked concepts; nonetheless, this paper will instead focus more on crude 
capacities. While the ‘hard’ security provided by hegemonic US dominance in the 
current unipolar system has made it possible for the EU to focus on ‘soft’ security 
issues and approaches, the direction the EU has moved, as outlined in Chapter 2, to 
take on a larger and more active role in global affairs and security will most likely 
mean that the EU’s role as a more traditional ‘hard’ security actor will become 
increasingly important in the future. It is in light of this that this paper will emphasize 
the impact of Turkish accession on the EU’s ‘hard’ security power capabilities through 
the ESDP.   
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 Due to its geostrategically significant location at the crossroads between 
continents, Turkey has long played a crucial role in European security and defense. 
Well before the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923, its predecessor, the Ottoman 
Empire, was integral in the balancing of Great Power alliances on the European 
Continent during the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries.  Beginning in 19th century, the 
Ottoman Empire can effectively be considered as an integrated part of the European 
order, participating in European security constructions from the Concert of Europe in 
1815 through to its alliance with the Central Powers in the First World War.154 With the 
foundation of the Republic in 1923, however, Turkey withdrew somewhat from the 
European security arena by pursuing a foreign policy of status quo and non-irredentism 
to focus its energies instead on the domestic tasks of rebuilding the nation and enacting 
the Kemalist project. However, the European security realignment at the end of the 
Second World War provided a window of opportunity for Turkey to take on a more 
active role in European affairs by expanding its security cooperation with the West.  
 Prompted by the threat of a resurgent and expansionary Soviet Union to its east, 
the Turkish Republic strengthened its ties to Western European security by joining 
NATO in 1952 as a full member. Turkey further solidified its ties to Europe by 
becoming a member of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) 
in 1948 and the Council of Europe in 1949. Through the OEEC, Turkey received 
Marshall Plan money from the American government to bolster its economic 
development and help contain the spread of Communism in the region.  Further, 
Turkey became an associate member to the European Economic Community (EEC), 
predecessor of today's European Union, under the Ankara Agreement in 1963. The 
Agreement was designed to tie Turkey closer to Western Europe by fostering trade and 
economic interdependency, the establishment of a customs union several years later, 
and the ultimate goal in mind of full Turkish membership in the EEC down the road. 
As Walter Hallstein, the EEC's then Commission President, said at the time, “One day 
the final step will be taken, and Turkey will become a full member of the European 
Economic Community.”155 Following the end of the Cold War, Turkey joined the 
reactivated Western European Union (WEU) as an associate member in 1992, to both 
take part in the emerging dialogue on the development of an ESDI and ensure its 
                                                 
154Meltem Müftüler-Baç, Europe in Change: Turkey's relations with a changing Europe, (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1997), p.15. 
155Tobias Knahl, “Turkey: The long road to EU accession,” Handelskammer Hamburg, 5/11/2003, from 
website, 
http://www.hk24.de/HK24/HK24/produktmarken/index.jsp?url=http%3A//www.hk24.de/HK24/HK2
4/servicemarken/ueber_uns/hamburger_wirtschaft/englische_artikel/Turkey.jsp. 
  58
involvement in all aspects of European security cooperation.  
 Turkish-European relations were shaped by the context of the Cold War era and 
the need for a strong, unified NATO to deter the threat of Soviet and Warsaw Pact 
expansionism from the east.  To solidify the Western Alliance and NATO's collective 
strategic security framework, Turkey was increasingly both institutionally and 
economically linked to the West through military and economic aid, trade, and its 
associate membership in the developing EEC. According to this logic, the military 
alliance would be stronger, closer, and more long lasting if it could expand its basis 
from shared security concerns and perceived national security interests to more 
permanent patterns of trade economic interdependency, and mutual benefit. This is in a 
sense the same logic that inspired Jean Monnet to propose the ECSC as a way of 
preventing future wars on the European Continent: unity through shared economy. 
Turkey's Cold War-era strategic value and subsequent incorporation in NATO made the 
country part of the West's mental conception of 'Europe' to a greater extent than it had 
been before. While the decision to incorporate Turkey into the Atlantic Alliance 
probably had more to do with the necessities of Cold War security than identity 
politics, inclusion in NATO took on a greater symbolic value in Turkey as a sort of 
vindication of the Westernization project of its national founder, Mustafa Kemal 
Ataturk.156  
 This should by no means understate the contributions that Turkey made to Cold 
War European security and defense, however, as the country played a key role on the 
front lines of the Western Alliance as NATO's southern flank. With the second largest 
military in NATO and the largest military on the European Continent, Turkey 
significantly aided in Western deterrence of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact 
allies. Most important of all, however, was Turkey's geostrategic position, which was 
the country's most vital Cold War-era contribution to the NATO Alliance.  As the 
guardian of the passage between the largely Soviet Black Sea and the wider 
Mediterranean, Turkey gave NATO a strong southern flank and blocked the USSR 
from advancing into the oil-rich Middle East. Turkey's Cold War contribution to 
European and Western security and defense cannot be underestimated: it was the basis 
on which, despite its location on Europe's periphery, the country was widely accepted 
into Europe and became a part of the European order.  
 With the end of the Cold War, the European security sphere underwent a period 
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of significant transformation. This was particularly acute in the case of Turkey, which 
saw the number of states on its borders increase by 50 percent in two years- 1991 and 
1992- alone.157 The rise of these new states in place of the Soviet threat on its eastern 
border presented Turkey with important new foreign and security policy challenges and 
opportunities. While the basic tenets of Turkish foreign policy since the foundation of 
the Republic in 1923 have been 'peace at home, peace abroad' and a commitment to 
both regional stability and the status quo158, the developments of the post-Cold War era 
both made it possible and necessary for Turkey to pursue a more active foreign policy. 
Turkey has begun to balance its Cold War era orientation towards the US and Western 
Europe with a greater regional role in the Balkans, Mediterranean, Caucasus, Middle 
East, and Central Asia. Although the orientation of Turkish foreign policy still remains 
the preservation of regional stability to ensure domestic security, the profound 
transformation of the region forced Turkey to adapt its policy to a new and different 
post-Cold War status quo. Rubin sees this shift as a fundamental realignment for 
Turkey and the harbinger of a new 'post-Ataturkist' period in Turkish foreign and 
security policy.159  
 However, as European security has undergone significant transformation in the 
post-Cold War era, Turkey has been marginalized to a certain extent from both the 
project of European integration and the new European security arrangements 
operationalized through the EU. In the absence of the Soviet threat, Turkey was seen as 
more of a a security 'consumer' than the key European security 'producer' it had been. 
160 Accordingly, Turkey's European identity and inclusion in the European order were 
sharply questioned. As a EU non-member state, Turkey has a limited ability to 
influence security and defense developments that seem to be increasingly taking place 
exclusively through an EU framework. While recent back and forth negotiations with 
the US and the EU have given Turkey a more prominent role in the EU's security and 
defense dialogue, the country has still seen its level of guaranteed involvement in 
European security diminish from the arrangements it enjoyed through its associate 
membership in the WEU in the mid to late 1990s. Although Turkey is simply too big 
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and too important to European security and defense to ignore entirely, it remains for the 
present somewhat peripheral to the EU's security and defense agenda.  
 Turkey had a clear role to play in European security during the Cold War, as an 
integral member of the NATO Alliance and a key ally in the Western camp of the 
bipolar political system. Turkish contributions to Western security gave Turkey a place 
in the European order and made it a part of Europe. However, the end of the Cold War 
brought about a dramatic change, as half the bipolar world fell apart, leaving only 
American hegemonic unipolarity. In this 'new world order,' Turkey's membership in 
NATO was no longer sufficient to ensure its perceived European identity, and Turkey 
became seen as an outsider on the periphery of the EU's European integration project. 
In the post-Cold War world, Turkey no longer had a clear cut role in European security, 
and consequently, it no longer had a clear cut role in Europe itself. It remained 
something of a vestige of the Cold War that Europe would neither explicitly embrace 
nor totally reject, and it was merely left standing on the sidelines.    
 While Turkey's acceptance as an official EU candidate country in December of 
1999 has helped somewhat ease its sense of divorce from European affairs in the post-
Cold War era, it has not entirely eliminated the sentiment. Despite the EU's claims that 
this shift is merely the result of its ongoing institutional reorganization, and not 
indicative of any EU anti-Turkish discrimination, Ankara remains unconvinced. 
Although Turkey's value as an ally in security and defense matters has increased in the 
post 9-11 world, its status within the emerging European framework has not yet fully 
reflected this. In the end, it remains to be seen whether Turkey's recent candidacy in the 
European Union is merely a result of American and Turkish pressure or of a more 
significant re-evaluation of Turkey's strategic importance on the part of the EU. While 
Turkey would bring to the European table security and defense assets that are 
undeniable, at the same time, the country's unique situation and geography is not 
without its own complications and the potential for new and uncertain challenges to the 
European security and defense project.      
  
Turkey and the Development of the ESDP in Post-Cold War Europe 
 
 In the aftermath of the Cold War, Turkey found itself marginalized from a 
security and defense dialogue in Europe that was increasingly focused on closer 
integration through the European Union. As the first chapter illustrated, the post-Cold 
War era has been marked by the development of the ESDI/ESDP concept, which has 
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evolved in the past decade and a half from an effort to strengthen the European pillar of 
NATO to the creation of a institutionally distinct European security and defense entity 
outside of NATO. With the incorporation of the WEU into the EU following the Treaty 
of Amsterdam and the changes in the status of WEU associate membership for non-EU 
member states, Turkey has been left without a voice in the process of European security 
and defense integration at the exact time when the process is increasingly institutionally 
and operationally autonomous from NATO. Given its proximity to the very unstable 
regions where the EU would be likely to be involved, Turkey sees its active 
involvement in shaping European security arrangement as a vital national interest. But, 
as a continuing candidate for EU membership, Turkey has been effectively excluded 
from the arena of European security decision-making within the EU. 
 From the onset of the post-Cold War dialogue on European security, Turkey 
was supportive of the idea of strengthening the European pillar of NATO through the 
development of an ESDI. However, Turkey, as a traditionally Atlanticist nation in 
outlook, sought to ensure that the development of the EDSI would not seek to replace 
NATO or compromise the important role that it played in European security and 
collective defense. NATO had proved a useful mechanism for ensuring a Turkish voice 
in European security affairs and integrating Turkey into the European order, and the 
Turks were reluctant to mess with a good thing. As Park explains, the Turks sought to 
develop a NATO-oriented ESDI which would complement, not compete with, NATO:   
In effect, the Turkish position is that all NATO’s European members should 
formally constitute the European pillar of NATO. NATO, not the EU, should be 
the starting point for  ESDI, and the WEU should remain as the bridge between 
the two institutions and the mechanism through which ESDI is expressed.161 
 
Turkey signed off on the agreements reached at the Berlin Summit in 1996 for the 
creation of an 'ESDI within NATO' to help establish this new framework. Turkish 
associate membership in the WEU has become operational the previous year, in 1995, 
whereby Turkey gained privileged access and solid participatory rights in WEU 
planning, decision-making, and operations, although it could not vote and lacked an 
equal political role in the organization.162 While associate membership in the WEU fell 
short of the full prerogatives of membership Turkey enjoyed in NATO itself, Turkey 
saw it as an acceptable compromise which ensured that it had a voice and a seat at the 
table in the emerging European security and defense framework.    
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 Unfortunately for Turkey, however, due to outside developments enumerated 
above in the first chapter, the consensus among EU member states regarding the ESDI 
began to change and the EU moved to merge the WEU directly into the EU under the 
Union's CFSP second pillar following the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. Britain finally 
gave in and accepted the need for an independent EU military capability in the joint 
Franco-British St. Malo Declaration in 1998. In response to these developments, the 
Communique from the Washington NATO Summit in 1999 stated that, in EU 
operations, the EU should seek, “the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European 
Allies in EU-led crisis response operations, building on existing consultation 
arrangements within the WEU.”163  
 At the Washington Summit, the US used its influence to ensure the unanimous 
support for its proposition that any future sharing of NATO assets with the EU would 
be contingent on case by case approval through a vote in the NAC. At the time, 
uncertainty about future plans and a lack of clear leadership within the EU allowed the 
US to push the proposal through without opposition from the EU NATO members. 
Although this proposal had clear ramifications for the EU's proposed security role, the 
EU had not yet worked out how it was going to operationalize its ESDP in the 
aftermath of the sudden breakthrough at St. Malo, so the US proposal at Washington 
managed to pass unopposed. The proposal was also supported by the Turkish 
government, as it would allow Turkey to maintain a level of case by case control over 
EU-led missions via its veto in the NAC. This decision was particularly important for 
Turkey, due to its ambivalent relations with the European Union, and it gave the 
country a certain reassurance that the EU's developing role in European security 
wouldn't negatively impact its own national and regional security interests or entail its 
marginalization from European security.    
 Nonetheless, several months later, the Cologne European Council Summit 
approved the development of the ESDP through the EU framework on the basis of the 
Franco-British agreement reached at St. Malo.164 As these developments gradually 
departed from the WEU framework and the rights that Turkey had enjoyed in it as an 
associate member, Turkey became increasingly concerned and saw the newly 
developed EU security arrangements as discriminatory against non-EU member states. 
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As this followed the EU's rejection of Turkey's bid to officially join the EU's candidate 
countries at the Luxembourg summit in December 1997,  it touched something of a raw 
Turkish nerve The Cologne arrangements certainly did nothing to dissuade the Turks 
from the perception that they were on the verge of being excluded from both the 
European project and new EU-centered arrangements for European security and 
defense. As Turkey saw it, the CESDP framework effectively meant that non-EU 
European NATO members, some of whom had been integrally involved in European 
security for over a half century, were relegated to a secondary status, while neutral EU 
non-NATO members (Ireland, Finland, Sweden, Austria), who had made minimal, if 
any, contribution to European security during the Cold War, would take on a more 
prominent role.  
 Turkey opposed the elaboration of a European security and defense role for the 
EU that excluded its guaranteed involvement in the decision-making process.  As an 
article in the Financial Times points out, “It also worries Turkey, a NATO member 
outside the EU, which fears that it will have less say over its own security.”165 Turkey 
was concerned that the EU could be taking on operations in its neighborhood without 
its inclusion in the decision-making process. Turkey has been particularly alert to the 
fact that EU-led operations could have an impact on Turkish security interests, as the 
areas in which the EU-led Petersberg task operations are likely to occur are within the 
Turkish sphere of influence. For example, in extraordinary circumstances, the EU could 
potentially, without Turkey having a say in the decision, intervene in Cyprus, the 
Balkans, or the Aegean in a manner favorable to Greek interests. However, more than 
just the potential impact on Turkey's vital interests, such a move would signal Turkey's 
definitive marginalization in European security and exclusion from its central decision-
making processes.  
 Much like the United States, Turkey has also made the argument that EU-led 
operations could potentially develop into more serious Article V situations, which 
would then invoke the commitment of non-EU NATO allies to aid the 11 EU NATO 
members in situations which the non-EU NATO members had no initial involvement. 
Turkey has also pointed out that, since the EU-led operations will be making use of 
units assigned to both NATO and the EU, as well as NATO capabilities and assets, EU-
led operations could potentially undermine NATO's ability to simultaneously respond 
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to unforeseen events with its full capacity.166  Despite these qualms, Turkey accepted 
the offer of EU candidacy during the Helsinki Summit in December of 1999, and this 
has allowed Turkey to participate in a more substantial way in the EU processes related 
to security and defense. It remains somewhat unclear, though, whether greater Turkish 
inclusion in the EU's emerging European security framework was merely the result of 
its candidate country status or whether it was Turkey's key contribution to European 
security that drove its candidacy for EU membership. It seems much more likely that it 
was the later, as Turkish official candidacy for the EU, 12 years after the first formal 
Turkish membership application in 1987, came at precisely the time (following St. 
Malo) when the EU was beginning to seriously elaborate the ESDP and when Turkey's 
potential contribution would have been of evidently significant value.      
 As the EU began to absorb the WEU in the late 1990s, a new debate arose over 
which group the EU's new PSC would prioritize meeting with on security and defense 
matters: the 13 EU candidate countries (to which Norway and Iceland are added, 
dubbed the '15+15' setup) or the 6 non-EU European NATO members (the '15+6'). As 
both a non-EU European NATO ally and a candidate country (following Helsinki in 
1999), Turkey would enjoy participation in both the '15+15' and the '15+6' groups. To 
add to the confusion, however, the agreement reached at the EU Council meeting in 
Feira in June of 2000 accepted both formats: the full '15+15' would be the standard 
meeting group, while special meetings would be held with the the '15+6' in situations in 
which the EU would call upon NATO assets.167 
 At was at this time that the EU also began to develop a criteria for non-EU 
European NATO member involvement in EU-led missions: the EU offered the '6' 
automatic participatory rights in all missions using NATO assets and a possible 
invitation in all operations that used exclusively EU assets. In any mission in which 
they contributed, the '6' would then have equal rights and equal responsibilities. 
However, as these arrangements didn't ensure the non-EU European NATO allies any 
say in deciding when the EU RRF would be deployed, Ankara rejected the deal as a 
demotion from the participatory the rights it had under the WEU framework.168 While 
it had not enjoyed a vote in final decision-making as an associate member in the WEU, 
Turkey had been allowed to participate on an equal basis in the decision-shaping 
process prior to final voting. One  conservative American commentator summed up the 
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Turkish concerns nicely when he wrote, “[it] has made the Turks fearful of being 
second-class allies who could be called upon to fight but excluded from a share in 
command.”169  
 To safeguarded its security interests and maintain its participation in decision-
making, Turkey pushed for the implementation of the consensus unanimously agreed 
upon in 1999 at the Washington Summit, which would have allowed for NATO-EU 
asset sharing on a case by case basis through a vote in the NAC (and thus would retain 
the potential for the Turkish use of its veto). The EU rejected this, as, having finally 
gotten its act together regarding the ESDP two months after Washington at the Cologne 
summit in 1999, it had no desire to see the ESDP's emergence stunted from the get-go, 
and it instead pushed for vote-free guaranteed access to NATO assets. At the Brussels 
NATO meeting in December 2000, this crisis came to a head when Turkey blocked a 
measure in the NAC to allow the EU to have automatic access to NATO planning 
capabilities (i.e., SHAPE).170 Unfortunately, this position put Turkey increasingly at 
odds with the US and left it isolated within the Alliance at large. An obviously irritated 
US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright even went so far as to accuse the Turks of 
exploiting the situation in an attempt to get in the EU by the 'back door,' although 
Ismail Cem, Turkey's then Foreign Minister, staunchly denied that this was the case.171  
 The US wanted an agreement on EU-NATO capability sharing as soon as 
possible, for fear that a delay would spur the EU to develop its own, independent 
capabilities outside of NATO.172 Accordingly, a compromise was hastily engineered by 
American, British, and Turkish diplomats, providing assurances that the EU would not 
be involved in disputes with NATO allies and allowing for the '6' to periodically meet 
with the PSC, both normally and during crises, to provide input, although this deal was 
rejected by the Turkish military as insufficient. Turkish rigidity on this point began to 
cause serious concern and even outright hostility among the EU member states, and it 
also ran the risk of alienating the US by undoing larger EU-US plans for European 
security and defense. As Webber et al. note, “This point marked the nadir in Turkish-
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EU deliberations over the CESDP.”173  
 The events of September 11, 2001, however, quickly underscored the immediate 
necessity of working out an operational arrangement between the EU and NATO that 
would be acceptable to Turkey. As Webber et al. point out, Turkey's unique role within 
the Alliance took on new strategic significance as the world's gaze turned to 
Afghanistan and its environs: 
As NATO's only Islamic member and a state with some influence in Central 
Asia, Turkey's strategic stock rose. Winning its agreement to- and thus potential 
participation and support for- CESDP operations consequently became even 
more important.  
Thus, further negotiations between Turkey, the US, and Britain took place in November 
of 2001, in an attempt to work out an agreement that would facilitate NATO-EU asset 
sharing and allow the EU to take over command of Operation Amber Fox in fYROM 
from NATO as projected in September of 2002. As a report from the NATO 
Parliamentary Assembly points out, the debate centered around Turkey's concerns 
about,  
an arrangement that would give the EU assured access to NATO capabilities 
without giving non-EU NATO members the right to participate fully in political 
and military decision-making for EU missions. The EU for its part has 
expressed unwillingness to grant non-EU members a veto on EU policies.174 
 
The Turkish, British, and American trio managed to work out another agreement, the 
so-called 'Ankara Document,' by the beginning of December 2001. The deal established 
that, in return for Turkey lifting its objections and allowing the EU access to NATO 
assets and planning capabilities, the EU would not involve itself in conflicts between 
NATO and EU members and that Turkey would be actively consulted whenever an 
EU-led operation would either affect Turkey's security interests or take place within 
Turkey's neighborhood.175 The Ankara Document effectively assuaged Turkish 
concerns about its the loss of a voice in emerging EU security arrangements by offering 
explicit written guarantees involving Turkey's security and geographical interests in the 
event of the deployment of the EU's RRF in its region.176 
 However, this was not the end of an already complicated story, as Greece 
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blocked the agreement at the European Council meeting in Laeken in December 2001, 
claiming it needed more time to study the document.177 In April of 2002, however, 
Greece vetoed an EU proposal to consult with Turkey regarding RRF deployment, 
because it gave Turkey an unfairly special status for a non-EU NATO member as well 
as an alarming role in EU decision-making in regions vital to Greek interests. By way 
of retaliation, at the Seville Summit in June 2002, Greece convinced the Spanish 
Presidency to give Greece the same security guarantees as Turkey in a newly rewritten 
version of the Ankara Document, which the Turks, naturally, rejected.178 A deal needed 
to be worked out that would keep Turkey from exercising its veto in NATO and Greece 
from doing likewise in either NATO or the EU. Until such an agreement could be 
worked out, the EU could not make use of NATO assets and capabilities and would be 
effectively operationally impotent in fYROM.  
 Lacking an agreement, the EU was unable to take over NATO's Operation 
Amber Fox in fYROM in September of 2002, and the US had to extent NATO's tour of 
duty there until a compromise could be reached.179  A mutually satisfactory 
compromise that both Turkey and Greece could accept was worked out shortly 
thereafter, and it was included in the Presidency Conclusions at the Copenhagen 
European Council in December of 2002. A last minute crisis flared up when Greece  
claimed that the arrangement would also have to be approved by Cyprus, but, under 
intense pressure from the EU, Cyprus quickly accepted the proposal without objections. 
As part of this agreement, the EU declared in the Copenhagen Presidency Conclusions 
that,  “the 'Berlin plus' arrangements and the implementation thereof will apply only to 
those EU Member States which are also either NATO members or parties to the 
'Partnership for Peace', and which have consequently concluded bilateral security 
agreements with NATO.”180  
 What this means in plain English is that, when the EU operates a mission using 
NATO assets, only those EU member states that are also NATO members or associated 
to NATO via the PfP program can participate. This compromise has effectively 
excluded both Cyprus (by design) and Malta (by necessity- can't just ban Cyprus) from 
any EU-led operation making use of NATO assets, as these two countries are neither 
NATO members nor party to NATO's PfP program. Under this deal, the two will also 
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be blocked from receiving classified NATO information. However, in all other 
respects, Malta and Cyprus will enjoy regular rights as EU members. 
 Thus, Turkey, the US, and the EU, through a process of intensive bargaining, 
finally worked out a deal that was sufficiently satisfactory that both Greece and Turkey 
removed the threat of a veto. Both sides came under intense pressure to accept the 
compromise arrangements, as their objections were the last hurdle preventing the EU 
from taking on its first mission. The EU assumption of command from NATO 
Operation Amber Fox in fYROM had already been delayed by several months, due to 
the difficulty in negotiating a compromise between Greece and Turkey. In exchange for 
security guarantees, Turkey removed its blockage in the NAC of the NATO-EU asset 
sharing formula, and this compromise represents a breakthrough of the utmost 
importance in the development of the ESDP. This step operationalized NATO-EU asset 
sharing and allowed the EU to finally take on its Petersberg tasks. In March of 2003, 
barely four after the compromise was enshrined in the Copenhagen Presidency 
Conclusions, the EU took on its historic first independent security operation, the newly 
renamed 'EUFOR Concordia.'  
 The Turkish-Greece NATO-EU stalemate had represented the last major 
obstacle to the realization of the ESDP, which significantly raised the stakes for all 
bargainers involved and made compromise more difficult. Turkish intractability in the 
debate was a frustrated response to NATO's lack of follow through for not 
implementing the 'case by case' approval process unanimously agreed upon at the 
Washington Summit in 1999. Furthermore, Turkey was also responding to its sense of 
exclusion from the development of the EU's emerging security and defense framework. 
The EU, however, only raised the tenor of the debate by insisting that, as a non-
member, Turkey should have no say in the debate, even though it is clear that the ESDP 
would have implications, perhaps even profound ones, for Turkish regional and 
national security interests. Thus, by effectively exploiting its veto power in NATO's 
NAC, Turkey used the issue of NATO-EU asset sharing to gain concessions from the 
EU to better protect its own security interests and temper its exclusion from the new 
European security arrangements operationalized through the EU.  
 Among the non-EU European NATO members, Turkey remains something of 
an exceptional case, which helps to explain its tough bargaining stance in the debate 
over NATO-EU asset sharing.  Three of the '6,' Hungary, the Czech Republic, and 
Poland, only became NATO members in 1999 and all three jumped ahead of Turkey's 
long-time bid by joining the EU in May of 2004. While this step helped to bring the 
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two organizations closer together by closing the EU-NATO membership gap within 
Europe to three, it did nothing to dispel Turkish notions about an anti-Turkish bias in 
the EU. Two of these remaining three non-EU European NATO members, Iceland and 
Norway, have made conscious decisions on the basis of national preferences to stay out 
of the EU and they would both most likely be expeditiously welcomed into the Union 
without controversy if public opinion were to sway in favor of joining. The same, 
however, cannot be said for Turkey.  
 There remains widespread public and political opposition to Turkish 
membership across Europe, and, even in the event that its bid is ultimately successful, 
Turkish accession to the Union is presently set for 2015 at the earliest. As Park writes, 
this presents Turkey with a unique problem among the dwindling number of non-EU 
European NATO members: 
Any EU-based security arrangements that do not satisfy Turkey’s desire to 
participate fully might have to be endured for a considerable time to come....the 
progress being made on ESDI has the potential to marginalize Turkey in this 
important aspect of Europe’s  “deepening” process well into the future.181 
 
Furthermore, Turkey is also unique among the remaining three non-EU European 
NATO members in that it plays, and has played for over a half century, a substantial 
role in European security and defense. Iceland, on the other hand, has effectively no 
independent military force to speak of, and Norway, while it has a military and has 
actively contributed to NATO, does not possess military capabilities anywhere near the 
magnitude of Turkey's.  
 Additionally, much more so than in either Iceland or Norway, the military and 
security apparatus plays an especially important role in policy formation within the 
Turkish state. Due to its formative role in the foundation of the Turkish Republic and 
its position as guardian of the Ataturkist legacy, the Turkish military, via the National 
Security Council (NSC), is probably more involved in day to day politics than the 
military of any other NATO member state.182 Turkey suffers from something of a 
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national 'insecurity complex,' generally referred to as 'Sèvresphobia,' which gives rise 
to a securitized society and a particularly prominent national security culture.183 
Accordingly, the Turkish military's feelings of exclusion from EU security and defense 
arrangements have been strongly reflected in its diplomatic bargaining with the EU, as 
was evident in its rejection of the first 2001 compromise. Although the military has 
receded somewhat in recent years as a result of the reforms undertaken in line with 
Turkey's EU bid, the military still retains a central and powerful role in Turkish 
political and national life. Uniquely among the non-EU European NATO allies, Turkey 
remains deeply concerned about ramifications of the security and defense decisions 
taken within the EU while, simultaneously, it finds itself held at arms length from 
membership in the Union and, thus, lacks the ability to influence on a equal basis these 
decisions.   
  
Turkey, the US, and the EU in the Post-Cold War Era 
 
 Following the end of the Cold War, the absence of the Soviet Union meant that 
Turkey's strategic value to the US and Europe was no longer assured, and it needed to 
find a new role to play which would re-confirm its value as an ally and a partner in 
strategic cooperation. A renewed partnership was particularly important to Turkey 
because, unlike virtually all of its NATO allies, it did not get any 'peace dividends' or 
an enhanced sense of national security in the aftermath of the Cold War, and it still 
sought the sort of guarantees that come with close security cooperation.184 Due to 
Turkish contributions during the Gulf War in 1991, however, the US quickly came to 
appreciate Turkey's continuing post-Cold War strategic and geographical value. In the 
Gulf War, Turkey provided significant assistance to coalition efforts by closing the 
Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline to the Mediterranean as part of the embargo on Iraq (the 
pipeline handled 54% of Iraq's oil exports), extending US access to Turkish military 
bases, deploying 100,000 troops to the Iraqi border (thereby threatening to open a 
second front), and allowing the coalition access to the NATO airbase at Incirlik for use 
in a sustained bombing campaign in central and northern Iraq.185 Turkey also  provided 
crucial power projection support for the US-led 'Operation Enduring Freedom' in 
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Afghanistan in 2001 by allowing the USAF to cross Turkish airspace in over 4,000 
sorties and make use of Incirlik airbase for its mission-critical logistical purposes.186 
Through its substantial contributions in the Gulf War and Afghanistan, Turkey 
highlighted its important role in facilitating the projection of American power in the 
Middle East and Central Asia.   
  This is not to say, however, that the US-Turkish 'strategic partnership' has not 
had its ups and downs in recent years. There have been lingering tensions in the US-
Turkish partnership due to the Gulf War's long-term economic and political 
ramifications for Turkey and , more recently, as a result of the Grand National 
Assembly's vote in March of 2003 to not allow US ground forces to open a 'second 
front' in the Iraq War by deploying from southern Turkey. Most of all, however, 
Turkish-US relations were damaged by a serious divergence over developments in 
Kurdish northern Iraq under the post-War US occupation, in which Turkey saw the 
potential emergence of an independent 'Kurdistan.' Although the US seems not to have 
appreciated the significance of this threat, it strikes to the very core of Turkish national 
security interests, given Turkey's large Kurdish minority and history of conflict with the 
PKK, a Kurdish separatist terror organization.  
 Since the Istanbul bombings in November 2003, however, the US and Turkey 
appear to have reached something of a limited rapprochement, with a focus on fighting 
terrorism (including the PKK in northern Iraq), an agreement to maintain the existing 
territorial borders of Iraq, and joint cooperation in both ISAF in Afghanistan and  the 
American-led 'Greater Middle East Initiative.'187 More generally, Turkey and the US 
retain strongly similar interests in promoting Middle East stability, opposing rogue 
states and the spread of WMDs in the region (especially Iran and Syria), and 
cooperating in 'the War on Terror.' As part of the 'Greater Middle East Initiative,' 
numerous American scholars and journalists as well as current US administration seem 
to view Turkey as a model state that is both Muslim and a secular democracy which 
will help “foster liberalization in the Islamic world,” although Ankara soundly rejects 
this line of thinking.188 The US strongly supports Turkey's increasing military and 
security cooperation with its other key ally in the region, Israel, as well as Turkey's new 
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roles as a force in the energy-rich Caspian and as a model for the Turkic states of 
Central Asia.189 The US has also been a strong proponent of Turkish accession to the 
European Union as a way of anchoring Turkey firmly in the West. Despite occasional 
disagreements, the US sees Turkey as a key ally in several regions of the world of 
significant importance to American national and security interests. 
 With the end of the Cold War, Europe has undergone a period of 
reprioritization, with a focus on the 'deepening' of the European integration project and 
a 'widening' of the Union to welcome the formerly communist Central and Eastern 
European countries into the West.190 These processes hurt Turkish-European relations, 
as they have enhanced the importance of shared 'European' values (human rights, 
democratization, etc) at the expense of common strategic concerns. As Turkey's 
relationship with Europe and its role in the West via its membership in NATO were 
strictly built around the 'hard' security concerns of the Cold War era, with the end of 
this era and a diminishing role in European security, Turkey has found its European 
identity called into question. This has been exacerbated by the rather late realization on 
the part of the Turks that NATO is not a monolithic body and good relations with the 
US would not necessarily translate into equivalently good ones with the EU.191 
However, it is worth noting here that the EU's relationship with Turkey has always 
been more fraught with difficulty than the Turkish-US 'strategic partnership' due to 
Turkey's demand for membership in the organization, which has complicated post-Cold 
War Turkish-EU rapprochement. 
 For those who see the EU as something of a 'civilizational' project, Turkey 
doesn't quite fit with their vision of 'Europe:' it's somehow 'too foreign,' 'too Asian,' or 
'too Muslim' to truly be considered for membership. In the words of Valery Giscard 
d'Estaing, the former French president, leader drafter of the EU Constitution, and 
Brussels insider par excellence,  Turkey simply cannot be a member of the EU because 
it, “has a different culture, a different approach, a different way of life.”192 For some 
ardent Europhiles, the EU takes on an almost strangely mystical quality, immune to 
functionalist arguments about Turkish 'geostrategic value' et cetera, as is evident in the 
words of one German MP: “The EU, as a community of nations and values, is too 
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important to be subjected to...merely strategic, functional reasoning.”193 This sort of 
'fuzzy' logic is particularly difficult for Turkey to argue against in its bid for EU 
membership as it seems to rely on an emotional, rather than logical, basis. As the 
author of the 'Charlemagne' column for The Economist pointed out in a rather timely 
article just recently, “Dry analysis is never quite enough when dealing with the EU. 
Most people who feel strongly about the subject start with a gut feeling- from which 
flow their subsequent arguments.”194  
 Moreover, in the post-Cold War era, an inward-looking Europe preoccupied 
with its own project of integration has been slower to recognize Turkey's continuing 
post-Cold War geostrategic value.  Traditionally, the EU, lacking a global agenda 
similar to America, has not placed importance on Turkey's role in the Middle East and 
has instead focused more directly on, “Turkey's European vocation and its implications 
for Turkey's role in and for Europe.”195 This was on display in early 2003 in the lead-up 
to the Iraq War, when France, Germany, and Belgium, all ostensible European  allies of 
Turkey in NATO, refused to let NATO consider deploying defensive assets (AWACs, 
Patriots, anti-WMD support, etc.) to Turkey to protect against any spillover from Iraq. 
The three opposed  the consideration because the UN Security Council had not yet 
approved the US-led military action, arguing that, “this would lock NATO into a 'logic 
of war'.”196  When war became imminent, the three backed down against intense 
American pressure, but only after Turkey had taken the unprecedented step of invoking 
Article IV of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states that, “Parties will consult together 
whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence 
or security of any of the Parties is threatened.”197 The three effectively held Turkish 
security captive to the transatlantic battle royale over the Iraq War, focusing on the 
Turkish deployment issue in a European context as a way of thwarting US unilateralism 
instead of seeing it in a broader context as a simple matter of a treaty obligation to a 
fellow NATO ally bordering on a potential future war zone.  
 With the development of the ESDP concept and the EU's efforts to bridge the 
gap between its economic and political roles in the world, Europe has gradually begun 
to reassess Turkey's potential strategic contributions. There are strong arguments for 
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Turkish inclusion in European security and defense on the basis of its geostrategic 
position and significant military capabilities. In both of these areas, Turkey could make 
an important contribution to the EU in its bid to play a larger role in security and 
defense. Up until now, the EU's plans for an autonomous ESDP have been largely long 
on talk and institution building, which are relatively inexpensive exercises, while EU 
member states have not made the necessary financial commitments to enhance the 
Union's limited military capabilities. Turkey, as a strong regional military power with 
the largest armed forces in Europe, can advance both the EU's security and defense 
capabilities and give it a more substantial presence in precisely the geographical areas 
on Europe's periphery where it sees itself playing a greater future role.   
 Another part of Europe's reappraisal of the Turkish contribution to security, 
much like that of the United State, has had to do with the influence of 9/11 and the idea 
of Turkey as a model for the rest of the Islamic world. Germany's Interior Minister, 
Otto Schily, elaborated on this theme, stating that Turkish accession to the EU would, 
“show the world that it is possible for Muslims and the West to live together on the 
basis of the values of the enlightenment and the UN charter of human rights.”198 As 
Joschka Fischer, the German Foreign Minister, has added, the events of 9/11 have 
convinced him that, “European integration also has a strategic dimension.”199 The 
argument is made that the inclusion of a predominately Muslim country in the EU 
would help the EU and US to posit that Western values and Islam are not incompatible. 
According to the argument, this would allow the West to tackle the challenge of Islamic 
terrorism without provoking a Huntingtonian 'Clash of Civilizations' between 
Christianity and Islam. However, since this argument is one largely about identity and 
values, and the focus of this paper is more strictly security, it falls outside the scope of 
this discussion.     
 
Turkey's Contribution to Cold War European Security 
 
 Since joining NATO in 1952, Turkey has been a key member of the Western 
Alliance and has made significant contributions to European security and defense. 
During the Cold War, as NATO's southern flank, Turkey was essential to European 
security as it helped deter the Soviet Union and served as an effective barrier to any 
Soviet effort to encroach on either the Middle East or the Mediterranean. Further, 
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through its control of the Dardanelles, the Marmara Sea, and the Bosporus, the 
waterways linking the Mediterranean and the Aegean to the Black Sea, Turkey strictly 
limited the maneuverability the Soviet Navy based in the Black Sea. Allied access to 
Turkish airbases, most especially to Incirlik near Adana, gave NATO air strike 
capabilities deep into the Soviet Union. Turkey's significant military capabilities also 
forced the Warsaw Pact to deploy units away from the central East-West front line in 
Germany to the Turkish-Bulgaria border. Furthermore, in the event of a Soviet attack 
along the German front line, Turkey would serve as the ideal point of entry for a NATO 
counterstrike into the Soviet Union.200  
 Turkey's role in NATO was built upon a quid pro quo exchange: in return for 
helping to deter the USSR with its forces and granting Allied access to its bases, 
Turkey was given a collective security guarantee through Article V, economic and 
military aid, and a say in deliberations and decision making regarding European 
security through NATO's North Atlantic Council (NAC). While the Turkish 
contribution to Western security during the Cold War was not selfless, it still 
constituted a significant risk for Turkey which deserves to be recognized, appreciated, 
and appropriately compensated. In the aftermath of the Cold War, many European 
allies seem oddly to have forgotten that Turkey was on the frontlines of the Cold War, 
helping to provide for their national security, when matters of expansion came up. As 
The Economist puts it, “As a longstanding NATO member, [Turkey] has been a crucial 
part of Europe's defenses. It has been a beacon of good sense in a combustible bit of the 
world.”201 It seems entirely illogical that a time-tested NATO ally, which has made 
substantial contributions to European security and defense for over fifty years, should 
be excluded from the EU's emerging security framework while militarily insignificant 
and neutral or non-aligned EU-member states are included. And what's more, Turkish 
inclusion in the European security and defense order could help ease competition 
between NATO and the EU by reducing their membership gap.   
  
Turkey's Geostrategic Value in the Post-Cold War World 
 
 Turkey's geostrategic position at the crossroads between continents has given it 
a disproportionately important role in regional and international security. While not one 
of the world's major powers, Turkey's geostrategic value as a transregional actor gives 
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it an importance almost unmatched by any other medium power.202 One analyst, as 
quoted in The Economist's recent survey on Turkey, even went so far as to describe 
Turkey as, “'the most geo-strategically important piece of real-estate in the world.'”203 
Further, Turkey's geostrategic significance has been particularly enhanced as of late 
with the fundamental regional transformation and realignment brought about by the end 
of the Cold War.  Turkey is no longer geographically defined, as it was in the Cold War 
era,  as a merely peripheral European security actor on NATO's southern flank. 
Moreover, the Turkish foreign and security policy agenda has widened significantly 
from its traditional core concerns of deterring Russia and managing crises with Greece.  
 As the Ministry of Foreign Affairs explains, the end of the Cold War brought 
about significant regional change and new opportunities for Turkish foreign policy:  
In the post-Cold War period, Turkey found herself at the center of a large 
landscape, Eurasia, stretching from Europe to Central Asia...Turkey has woven 
an intricate web of peaceful relations in a multitude of geographies and can, as a 
secular pluralistic democracy, be a source of inspiration for other nations 
desiring reform in her extended region.204  
Turkey found new opportunities to reconnect with distant cousins in Central Asia and 
neighbors closer to home in the Balkans and the Caucasus that had been walled off 
behind the Iron Curtain for decades. In the post-Cold War era, Turkey has taken on a 
more significant and multidimensional role as a major transregional actor involved in 
the Balkans, the Black Sea, the Middle East, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the 
Mediterranean. As a result, as Rubin has noted, “Turkey has one of the most 
complicated foreign policy situations in the world.”205 Turkey's geostrategic position 
has taken on an even greater importance given the myriad and unpredictable challenges 
facing Western security in the aftermath of the Cold War, although it seems that the US 
has been quicker to acknowledge and exploit this than the European Union.  
 Nonetheless, Turkey's incorporation into the European security and defense 
framework would be geostrategically beneficial for the EU, as it would allow the Union 
to play a more comprehensive role in the Balkans, as well as a bigger role in the 
Caucasus, the Caspian, the Middle East, and Central Asia. However, with the inclusion 
of Turkey and the expansion of the EU's security and defense radar to include these 
                                                 
202Mustafa Aydın, “Securitization of History and Geography: Understanding of Security in Turkey,” 
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 3, No.2, (May 2003), p.163. 
203The Economist, “A survey of Turkey,” March 19, 2005, p.5. 
204MFA, p.2. 
205Rubin, p.1. 
  77
new regions, there are a number of possible security problems that should not be 
overlooked when considering the Turkish security situation. It is also worth noting that 
Turkish and EU security priorities are not identical, principally in that many of 
Turkey's vital national security interests are in line only more generally with broader 
EU's goals. However, it is the contention of this paper that, considering both the 
benefits of its inclusion and the costs of its exclusion, Turkey would make an important 
contribution as a security provider in the EU's emerging security and defense 
framework. If the EU wants to foster long-term prosperity and stability on its eastern 
and southern periphery, Turkey could play a crucial role by working with the EU to 
tackle the sources of the increasing number of transregional security challenges that 
affect both Europe and its periphery.206 Turkey is a key player in Europe's southeastern 
periphery, and, if the EU wants to play an increasingly role in the region, it will need to 
find a way to fit Turkey into that framework, as Turkey is simply too big and too 
important an actor to be overlooked in any serious European security and defense 
scheme. 
 Turkish incorporation into the European security and defense framework would 
give the Union the ability to play a more active and involved role in the Middle East. 
Turkey possesses important power projection capabilities, most especially its NATO 
airbase at Incirlik, which would greatly aid the EU in rapid deployment to potential 
crisis points in the Middle East. As noted above, Incirlik proved vital in conducting the 
air campaign in the Gulf War in 1991 as well as maintaining the 'no fly zone' in 
northern Iraq in the subsequent years. This facet would be especially useful for the EU, 
as power projection is one of the major military capabilities that the Union lacks. As 
Müftüler-Baç adds, “it is not a far-fetched claim that access to Turkey’s military bases 
(as well as Turkish participation) would be crucial for the success of any possible 
NATO/EU operation in the Middle East.”207 Furthermore, Turkey's strategic ties with 
Israel, Jordan, and, to a lesser extent, Egypt would also be advantageous to the EU in 
helping to fight WMD proliferation and fundamentalist Islamic terrorism, as well as 
fostering a peace settlement in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.  
 There is also a counter argument these propositions that further EU involvement 
in the Middle East could also be a source of instability for the Union. Turkish inclusion 
would extend Europe's borders to the Middle East, to countries like Syria, Iran, and 
Iraq. Although this would provide the EU with incredible new opportunities to pursue 
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its 'European- Mediterranean Partnership' (aka Barcelona Process) to try and expand 
the halo of European stability and development, which has worked so well in Central 
and Eastern Europe over the past 15 years, to at least part of this troubled region. While 
an expansion towards the Middle East provides tantalizing opportunities, it certainly 
remains something of a risky development at the same time because of the vast political 
uncertainties.  
 Turkish integration into ESDP could also help the Union better ensure the 
security and diversity of its oil and gas imports. As Solana notes, “Energy dependence 
is a special concern for Europe. Europe is the world’s largest importer of oil and gas. 
Imports account for about 50% of energy consumption today. This will rise to 70% in 
2030.”208 At present, the three major sources of oil and gas for Europe are North 
Africa, Russia, and the Gulf. Inclusion of Turkey into the European security framework 
could help to better secure Gulf oil traveling to Europe through Turkish pipelines and 
Russian oil passing through the Turkish Straits. Furthermore, with Russia increasingly 
taking on the lion's share of the European energy market, Turkey's strategic role in the 
oil and gas producing regions of the Caspian and Central Asia could open up new 
opportunities for the EU to diversify its suppliers. In an era when the Russians are 
increasingly re-nationalizing control of energy corporations to exploit gas and oil as a 
tool of foreign policy, an active effort against over-reliance on Russian energy would 
only seem prudent. Diversification will contribute to improving the security and 
continuity of the oil supply to Europe. The recently opened Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan oil 
pipeline and the proposed Baku-Tblisi-Erzurum gas pipeline could possibly also help to 
ease rapidly increasing European reliance on Russian energy.209 However, it is worth 
noting that this aspect of Turkish inclusion could also run the risk of potentially 
increasing EU conflict with Russia over energy politics in the Caspian and Central 
Asian regions, where it still retains significant interests.      
 Turkey is in a position of both unique opportunity and remarkable vulnerability 
in respect to its geographical proximity to potentially unstable regions in the Balkans 
and the Caucasus. A significant number of conflicts have already taken place within 
Turkey's neighborhood in the post-Cold War period, including the Gulf War; the crises 
in Bosnia and Kosovo; and conflicts in Nagoro-Karabakh, Chechneya, and Abkhazia. 
Furthermore, thirteen of the 16 potential 'hot spots' of concern to European security as 
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determined by NATO are in Turkey's immediate neighborhood.210 Turkey's proximity 
to these unstable regions effectively illustrates how it could be of use to the EU in 
future crisis prevention, intervention, and management on Europe's periphery. Turkey 
has shown itself willing to contribute troops, police, civilian assistance, and 
humanitarian aid in crisis situations in the area, as has been evident in its participation 
in numerous NATO and UN peacekeeping missions in the region in recent years, 
including in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, Kosovo, and Georgia. Turkey can also aid 
the EU's crisis management role by facilitating access and deployment to 'hot spots' in 
its vicinity, as well contributing its own substantial local knowledge and assets within 
the region. Turkey has a keen interest to contribute to stability and security in the 
Balkans and the Caucasus, as these largely former Ottoman lands are of particular 
policy interest due to their numerous shared historical, cultural, and ethnic links with 
Turkey.   
 Of course, there is also a downside to Turkey's proximity to unstable regions, as 
it may drag the EU into security problems that it would not otherwise have been 
involved in. It is easier for the EU to ignore crises in such politically uncomfortable 
areas (say, Chechneya) as long as they're far away, but when they're suddenly right on 
the borders of the EU, that becomes much more difficult to do. This could prove 
especially tricky for the EU in cases having to do with crises in or nearby Russia, which 
could potentially have the impact of drawing the Union into conflict with Russia itself. 
For example, Chechen terrorists have staged small scale sieges in Turkey twice in 
recent years to gain publicity for their cause, provoking Turkish public opinion.211 
Furthermore, Turkey's shared ties with Turkish and Muslim minority groups in the 
Balkans and Caucasus also have the potential to give the perception that the country is 
not an impartial actor. Thus, Turkish integration into European security and defense 
could have the consequence of increasing the number of crises, and especially 
uncomfortable ones involving Russia (one of the EU's major oil suppliers) or areas of 
Russian interest, that the Union could be forced to deal with, as well as potentially 
complicating the crisis management missions which the Union pursues in the region.  
 It is worth emphasizing that Turkey's geostrategic contribution to Europe's 
security is not merely a matter of its location next to troubled spots. New 
developments, as Lesser points out, are also crucial to understanding the importance of 
Turkey's role in the region: 
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Turkey is most directly affected by a key trend shaping Western security: the 
erosion of traditional distinctions between the European, Middle Eastern, and 
Eurasian theaters...Turkey is at the center of this phenomenon and the country's 
future role will be strongly influenced by it.212  
 
As this statement indicates, in the uncertain post-Cold War world, issues affecting 
European regional security are becoming increasingly globalized. The new global 
terrorist threat of Al-Qaeda is a perfect example of this phenomenon: an elusive Saudi 
terrorist leader somewhere on the Afghani-Pakistani border provides direction, 
guidelines, or inspiration for attacks which are directed against targets all around the 
world, from US troops in Iraq and the British Consulate in Istanbul to Spanish trains 
and the London subway system. President Bush summed up this idea of the 
increasingly global interconnectivity of security quite well recently (or rather, he 
quoted someone who did), when he spoke at Ft. Bragg at the end of June, stating, “The 
commander in charge of coalition operations in Iraq, General John Vines, put it well 
the other day. He said, 'We either deal with terrorism and this extremism abroad, or we 
deal with it when it comes to us.'”213  
 In this day and age, the major defining issues of European security stretch well 
beyond the Continent and concerns about conventional warfare As Javier Solana, the 
EU's CFSP chief pointed out at the end of 2003, “The post Cold War environment is 
one of increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security 
are indissolubly linked.”214 In this same paper, Solana also highlighted the most 
important security challenges facing Europe, including terrorism, proliferation of 
WMDs (especially in the Middle East), regional conflicts, state failure, and organized 
crime (particularly drugs and people trafficking). While the end of the Cold War has 
drastically reduced the likelihood of a conventional war in Europe, the new security 
challenges of the post-Cold War era are unpredictable and will require new strategies 
and even greater cooperation. With these new challenges, as he states, “the integration 
of acceding states increases our security but also brings the EU closer to troubled areas. 
Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European 
Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean.”215 Thus, as Solana notes, it is more 
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and more important in today's world that the EU actively engage in security 
cooperation with states on its periphery in order to preserve its own security.  
 Turkey is perfectly positioned to help the EU tackle these new security issues, 
as it is a strong, stable, and effective regional power increasingly interested in tackling 
transregional security issues within its troubled neighborhood. Turkey's dual role as 
both a European and Middle Eastern actor should help the EU bridge this cultural and 
geographical divide and expand into the Middle East region to tackle issues relating to 
terrorism and WMD proliferation. Furthermore, based on the experience of its long 
struggle against the PKK, Turkey could help the EU with its own fight against 
terrorism. As outlined above, Turkey's proximity to unstable areas on Europe's 
periphery could help the EU quickly and effectively respond to regional conflict and 
the threat of state failure. Turkey would also be a crucial contributor in the EU's 
struggle against organized crime, as, with EU assistance, it could help crack down on 
its large mafia-run drugs and people trafficking networks. It is estimated that as much 
as 75% of the heroin coming into Europe has either transited or been processed in 
Turkey216, and Turkey is also an important link in the business of smuggling people 
into Europe, due to its close proximity by water to both Greece and Italy.217 With better 
security cooperation within the EU framework, Turkey could play a key role in shutting 
this trade down and improving European security as a whole. On the very issues that 
Solana has pointed out as being the key future challenges to European security, Turkey 
could make a substantial and significant contribution. As these are challenges that by 
their very nature affect both the external and the internal security of the EU, the 
Turkish contribution in this case would be beneficial to the EU  under both the second 
(CFSP) and third pillars (Home Affairs). 
 At the same time, however, a counter argument can be made that the inclusion 
of Turkey into the European security sphere could also be problematic in that it could 
facilitate the export of Turkey's domestic security problems into the European Union. 
While Turkish incorporation might help the EU tackle the new security challenges, 
such as drugs and people trafficking, envisioned in the its ESS, Turkey's substantial 
involvement in perpetuating both of these problems is something of a double-edged 
sword. While Turkish inclusion may help foster a more effective pan-European 
response to these problems, the expansion of the EU to Turkey's borders in the Middle 
East and the Caucasus could also exacerbate them in the short-term by making access 
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to the EU easier for criminal elements. As the EU has eliminated internal borders 
within the Union and allows free movement for tourists and narco-mafia dons alike, the 
inclusion of Turkey would simply bring the Union several geographical steps closer to 
the sources of its troubles. In the long-run, however, the enhanced regional security, 
stability, and development fostered by EU expansion in the area might help to resolve 
the origins of these problems. 
 Finally, it is also worth noting that Turkey also has unresolved problems with 
two present members of the European Union, Cyprus and  Greece, on issues relating to 
the Turkish military presence in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Cyprus) and 
ongoing disputes over the division of the underwater shelf and control of Aegean 
islands (Greece). Turkish inclusion in this case would not actually expose the Union to 
new security challenges per se, as it already faces these problems due to Greek and 
Cypriot membership, but Turkey could still further complicate these existing problems. 
On the other hand, though, the argument could also be made that Turkish inclusion in 
the EU could be beneficial in helping to resolve some of these problems either in the 
accession process itself or by gradually strengthening mutual economic 
interdependency and ties of political cooperation through the Union's activities. 
 
Turkey's Military Capabilities 
 
 One of the strongest potential benefits of incorporating Turkey into the EU's 
security and defense framework remains the Turkish military contribution. Turkey has 
one of the highest levels of defense spending in the world, totaling some $11.7 bn 
(4.9% of GDP) in 2003218, which made it the 11th largest national spender on defense 
last year. Unlike virtually all of the rest of Europe, Turkey has actually been 
aggressively increasing its defense spending since the end of the Cold War. Since 1998, 
the Turkish military has undertaken a ten-year, $30bn military modernization campaign 
(which may rise to $150bn over 30 years), focusing on upgrading its battle tanks, attack 
helicopters, assault rifles, and advanced aircraft systems.219 The CIA has deemed the 
project a success, and writes that Turkey now possesses, “highly mobile forces with 
greatly enhanced firepower in accordance with NATO's new strategic concept.”220 
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 Furthermore, Turkey has the second largest military in NATO and the sixth 
largest standing military in the world, totaling some 1,043,550 total troops, with 
514,850 on active duty, 378,700 in reserves, and 150,000 in the gendarmerie/national 
guard.221 Turkey has a conscript-based military staffed largely through the 15 months 
of mandatory military services performed by all young men, although the officers, 
senior staff, and specialists are all professionals career soldiers. With its large number 
of troops, increasing levels of defense spending, and rapidly modernizing military 
capabilities, Turkey would be a vital contribution to any EU-led efforts to establish a 
truly independent military capacity.  
 However, since the end of the Cold War, the practice of warfare has changed 
significantly and Turkish military capabilities are no longer as relevant to today's 
challenges as they were in the past. Cold War era military strategy placed an strong 
emphasis on large conventional military forces (heavily armored tanks, artillery, etc) 
capable of fighting sustained ground battles, with the assistance of air support, along 
the NATO-Warsaw Pact front lines. In this dynamic, the enemy was a known state with 
conventional military capabilities which could be prepared for and effectively deterred. 
The end of the Cold War has seen a shift in the security environment to much greater 
unpredictability and uncertainty. In today's world, security challenges are unlikely to 
come exclusively from conventional state actors in such set battles, and the new 
priority is on combating emerging threats, like proliferation of WMDs, terrorism, 
organized crime, and spillover from regional conflicts. As the 'National Military 
Strategy of the United States' points out, threats today may, “range from states to non-
state organizations to individuals.”222 
 Accordingly, strategies, threat-matrices, and military capabilities developed 
during the Cold War are no longer appropriate to respond to these new and 
unpredictable challenges. The US has pioneered new military tactics for the post-Cold 
War era, based around the use of overwhelming air superiority, special forces, 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), high tech satellite intelligence, and seamlessly 
integrated battlefield command. The new focus is on lighter, more agile, more mobile, 
and quicker units, while heavy and slow military forces, and most especially large 
conscript-based armies, are decidedly less useful in waging modern war. As Lanier 
points out, Turkey is engaged in the process of modernizing its military along these 
lines: “Instead of a large, heavy, and cumbersome army, Turkey is transforming its 
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armed forces into a swift, mobile, flexible cadre with rapid deployment capabilities 
available for out of area operations.”223  
 While Turkey has undertaken a significant military modernization program in 
recent years, the program is still something of a work in progress and Turkish 
modernization lags behind other NATO allies. Furthermore, although it is slowly 
reducing the conscript element of its armed forces, with the eventual goal of shifting to 
an all-professional army, the Turkish military is still largely oriented around the 
outmoded conscript system.224 Thus, even in the area in which the argument for 
Turkey's inclusion seems the strongest, its potential military contribution, it still has the 
potential be something of a burden. Given that the EU seems to envision its role 
primarily in areas such as peacekeeping, crisis management, and humanitarian 
intervention, and not in waging full scale intense combat operations per se, however, it 
seems unlikely that Turkey's ongoing and incomplete process of military modernization 
would be a serious impediment.  
 Perhaps more importantly from the perspective of the EU, in line with the 
Petersberg tasks, the Turkish armed forces have also had significant peacekeeping 
experience in recent years. As the Ministry of Foreign Affairs points out: 
Turkey has participated in many peace-keeping and peace enforcement 
operations...such as  those in Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, Kosovo 
and Georgia. Moreover, Turkey assumed the command of ISAF II in 
Afghanistan and contributed around 1400 troops ...between June 2002 and 
February 2003...[and]continues to provide support to ISAF with 
 approximately 250 military personnel. Moreover, according to the rotation 
plan...the 3rd  Corps  stationed in Istanbul (NRDC-TU) will assume  command 
of ISAF VII between  February and August 2005. 225  
 
Due to its experience combating the PKK, the Turkish military also has substantial 
experience in long-term, low-intensity operations of the sort that might also be common 
in the Petersberg tasks.226 Even as a non-EU member state, Turkey has volunteered to 
contribute more troops to the EU's RRF than almost any other EU member: in 
November of 2000, Turkey promised to make available six thousand troops, 36 F-16s, 
two troop transports, and a number of ships available to the RRF, in return for a 
guaranteed role in security decision-making within the EU's ESDP, with the possibility 
of even more troops if the the arrangements were acceptable.227 Given that the EU's 
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own Headline Goals for the RRF only anticipated 50,000 to 60,000 total troops (plus 
reserves, due to rotation), this is a significant contribution. As Müftüler-Baç adds, 
“Turkey’s participation in the EU’s possible military operations could contribute 
significantly to their success and, maybe, could determine their feasibility.”228    
 However, even in this situation where the Turkish contribution to European 
security and defense might seem unassailable, it is worth noting that the Turkish 
military is somewhat out of step with the security philosophy of the EU. Although the 
EU has taken on a more traditional approach in seeking to build up its military power 
projection capabilities in recent years, it must not be overlooked that the Union still 
favors the exercise of 'soft' power to ensure security, largely through non-military 
measures like enlargement, second-track diplomacy, conflict prevention and resolution, 
trade and economic links, and 'soft governance.'229 As Oğuzlu points out, ”on balance, 
today’s EU is more of a normative–civilian actor than a global military one.”230 But 
Turkey doesn't have much in the way of experience in the use of this sort of 'soft' 
power, as its security policy, much like America's, is still largely oriented around the 
Cold War logic of 'hard' power. Thus, while even Turkey's significant capabilities 
would doubtless prove beneficial to the EU's efforts to assert itself more as a traditional 
security actor in international affairs, for Turkey to be truly integrated into the EU's 
security order it must make more of an effort to expand into something of a role in 'soft' 
security as well.  
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Potential Contributions Potential Costs 
History of contribution to European security Not necessarily applicable now, and lingering 
security conflict with EU members Greece and 
Cyprus 
Geostrategic role as transnational actor in 
Balkans, ME, Caucasus, Central Asia, and 
Mediterranean/S. Europe (key regions 
elaborated individually below) 
Could draw the EU into more crises, especially 
in the ME and in the Caucasus (potential for 
conflict with Russia) 
Could help and allow EU play more active role 
in ME (Incirlik, ties with Israel, Jordan, Egypt) 
and aid 'Barcelona Process' 
EU borders with Syria, Iraq, and Iran, new 
potential for getting caught up in very dangerous 
part of the world (WMDs, terrorism, etc) 
Turkish role in Caspian and Central Asia could 
help secure and diversify EU energy needs 
Could potentially increase conflict with Russia 
over its interests in Caspian and Central Asia 
Turkish proximity could help EU spread 
regional security and stability to Balkans and 
Caucasus 
Could draw the EU into more crises, especially 
in the Caucasus, with the potential for conflict 
with Russia 
Could help EU tackle transregional threats 
(WMDs, terrorism, organized crime, etc) to 
Euro internal and external security, as outlined 
in ESS 
Turkish inclusion could also facilitate export of 
these problems into the EU 
Use of Turkey's significant military capabilities 
(including the largest military in Europe) in 
ESDP EU Petersberg tasks 
Military still in process of modernizing, armed 
forces built around outmoded conscript system, 
and little prior focus on 'soft' security tools and 
some EU Petersberg tasks 
  
  
 
Turkey's inclusion in the EU’s ESDP framework would be beneficial for the EU 
in a wide variety of capacities.  In short, the Turkish assets can be summed up as: its 
Table 1.1: Potential Turkish Contributions and Costs to the ESDP
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long history as a contributor to European security during the Cold War; its geostrategic 
position as a Eurasian transregional actor bordering on the Balkans, Caucasus, 
Mediterranean, Middle East, and Caspian region; its contribution to tackling the EU's 
security goals as set out in the ESS; and its significant military capabilities. However, 
none of these contributions is without a potential downside which could end up 
significantly complicating European security.  Geostrategically, it would allow the 
Union to play a more comprehensive role in the Balkans, as well as a bigger role in the 
Caucasus, the Caspian, the Middle East, and Central Asia. However, it is worth noting 
that the expansion of the EU's security and defense sphere into these new regions 
entails a number of new risks and potential security problems that should not be 
ignored.  
 Furthermore, as Turkey possesses Europe's largest military, one of the most 
significant benefits of Turkish inclusion into the EU's security and defense framework 
remains the Turkish military contribution, although this, too, is not without its own 
potential drawbacks.  If the EU wants to foster a secure, prosperous, and stable 
southern and eastern periphery, the inclusion of Turkey could facilitate that effort by 
helping the EU to take on the root causes of instability, poverty, crime, and other 
increasingly transregional issues that affect both the area and increasingly the EU itself. 
It is the contention of this paper, however, that Turkish inclusion would strongly 
complement the ‘hard’ security power capabilities of the European Union, as expressed 
through the ESDP framework. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
 
 Since the end of the Cold War, changing priorities have rendered Turkey 
something of an outsider in European affairs, and this shift has been reflected in 
Turkey's exclusion from the Continent's expanding European project and the new 
security and defense arrangements operationalized through the EU's ESDP framework. 
For a country that had enjoyed an important role in Europe during the Cold War 
through its membership in NATO, this rather sudden transformation came as something 
of a shock. While Turkey and the European Union have had somewhat difficult 
relations for a number of years, they have become even more strained in the post-Cold 
War era, as an inwardly-turned EU, concerned with its own institutional development 
and the processes of 'deepening' and 'widening,' has become increasingly unsure of 
Turkey's position, contribution, and even identity within Europe. As the EU shifted 
from the 'hard' security concerns of the Cold War period to a more expansive 
understanding of security, including a far greater emphasis on 'soft' security tools such 
as governance, enlargement, and economic development, Turkey has found its own 
'hard' security contributions to be increasingly out of step with the EU. 
 Although Turkish-American ties have also gone through a rough patch in the 
years following the end of the Soviet Union, the United States has maintained a more 
continuous interest in fostering a variety of new roles for Turkey within both NATO 
and the context of their bilateral 'strategic partnership.' However, Turkey was rather 
belated in appreciating that, in the post-Cold War period, good relationship with the US 
would no longer ensure a similarly good one with the Europeans231, and at times now it 
even seems to have the opposite effect. Although the US has strongly indicated its 
support for Turkish EU membership and inclusion in emerging European security and 
defense arrangements, US influence has its limits, and the efforts may even be 
construed by some in the EU as damaging to Turkey's chances, given broader US-
European divergence in recent years. 
 Although the Europeans have pursued the project of elaborating a more 
'European' component to the framework of European security, in the early 1990s, this 
effort was largely concerned with institution-building and increasing operational, as 
well as foreign and security policy, autonomy. However, following the humiliating 
experience of European impotence during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, in 
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what Luxembourg's Prime Minister and then-EU foreign policy chief Jacques Poos 
called, “Europe's hour,”232 the member states of the EU found their 'soft' security focus 
in need of a more substantial 'hard' component. While this may not have diminished 
their preference for 'soft' security approaches, the experience of being unable to stop 
genocide in their own 'backyard' without American assistance left the Europeans well 
aware of the need to increase their military capabilities or risk becoming geopolitical 
straw men. At the same time, however, both European governments and the public 
seem to be unwilling to take on the long-term fiscal investment necessary to bring their 
capabilities more in line with that of America's. 
 In the post-Cold War world, although the EU has aspired to play a greater role 
in international affairs, with all the military and operational responsibilities such a role 
entails, it has found itself in something of a bind. The gap between its lofty foreign and 
security policy goals and its military capabilities has left it with few options: either it 
must revise its goals, enhance its capabilities, or find some other, third way out. As the 
EU remains strongly committed to its foreign and security policy goals, and the 
member states remain just as committed to not increasing their defense spending in the 
manner necessary to seriously enhance the Union's military power, that leaves the EU 
with only the third choice: find some other way out of this mess. It is precisely in this 
context that Turkey, with its substantial potential contribution to European security, 
warranted reassessment by the Europeans. As Müftüler-Baç argues, the cost-benefit 
analysis of Turkish inclusion in the European security framework at this point was 
integral to the EU's decision to make Turkey an official candidate country at Helsinki 
in December of 1999.233    
 In light of the Europeans efforts to establish an operational CFSP with a strong 
ESDP element, the value of the potential Turkish contribution to European security 
took on an increasing luster. As the first chapter pointed out, Europeans have long 
sought to develop a security and defense policy autonomy that would allow them, 
outside the framework of US-dominated NATO, to make decisions, shape policies, and 
implement actions that reflect their own priorities and concerns. The potential Turkish 
contribution could actually allow the EU's ESDP to finally accomplish that end. 
Turkey's inclusion could also allow the ESDP to take on real teeth and aid in it playing 
an increasingly important role in shaping global security. Furthermore, Turkey could be 
particularly helpful in making the EU's threat of force more credible, given its 
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willingness to actually use its military.     
 Although the Turkish security contribution has been enough to get Turkey out 
of the EU's hallway and into its waiting room, it is quite unclear at present if will be 
sufficient to ensure its eventual membership. When the EU set out the 'Copenhagen 
criteria' for Turkey in 1993 and made future negotiations on entry contingent on their 
fulfillment, many in Europe seem to have simply assumed that this represented 
something of an impossible burden and that the Turkish bid would somehow fade away 
in the night. However, this has proved not to be the case, and Turkey has been quite 
vigorous in pursuing reforms across the board in line with its bid for membership. 
These reforms, in a sense, illustrate the effectiveness and the power of the EU's 
enlargement policy, as the dangling carrot of membership has given impetus to an 
almost unparalleled period of transformation and reform within Turkey.    
 There are, of course, a whole host of other, non-security factors that come into 
play as the EU assesses the Turkish candidacy, including matters pertaining to Turkey's 
economic and political situation, and even domestic European factors, and these will 
surely also play an important role in determining Turkey's eventual status vis à vis the 
EU. As the recent EU Constitutional referendum fiasco illustrated, the EU is also in 
serious need of reconnecting with national public opinion in the member states and 
articulating a clearer and more comprehensible vision for the future of the European 
project. While these developments have little to do with Turkey per se, Turkey serves 
as something of a catalyst for discussion about the future of the EU for many in Europe, 
and, as such, the question of Turkish membership is a particularly complex one.  
 Nonetheless, as this paper has pointed out, Turkey has a strong case in arguing 
the value of its potential contribution to the EU’s ESDP. While Turkish incorporation 
into the European framework would entail the EU taking on significant new security 
risks, it would also greatly enhance the Union's military capabilities and ability to play 
a greater role in a number of important regions on Europe's periphery. It must be 
emphasized, however, that Turkey retains something of a different understanding of 
security than the EU, with a more lingering focus on 'hard' security and military power. 
While the EU has come around to increasingly re-appreciating the necessity of 'hard' 
security in its foreign and security policy, there still remains something of a disconnect 
in the language and focus of security between Turkey and the EU, and Turkey will also 
need to adopt a greater orientation towards EU priorities in, for example, 'soft' power 
employment and Petersberg task missions. The EU could help introduce Turkey into its 
security dialogue by 'softening' it up a bit, and, vice versa, Turkey could help add some 
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'hard' security backbone to the EU's foreign and security policy project.    
 While it will be up to the Europeans to make the ultimate decision whether or 
not the potential Turkish military contribution to the ESDP is sufficient to warrant 
Turkish inclusion in the emerging EU order, Europe will nonetheless need to come to 
terms with the new post-Cold War Turkey through some sort of a cooperative 
arrangement. If this does not take on the form of membership, then the EU will have to 
find some other mechanism by which to incorporate Turkey into the European security 
framework. Given Turkey's increasing active foreign policy and role as a transregional 
actor on the European periphery, Turkish policy decisions and actions will have 
ramifications of ever more significance and importance for European security.234 This 
dynamic will continue to become more apparent in the coming years, as the center of 
gravity in the EU shifts eastward with the gradual institutionalization of the Union's 
new members and the EU's future expansion into the Balkans (Bulgaria, Romania, 
Croatia, etc). The impact of Turkey on security within the expanding European Union 
will only become more important in the future, and the Union will simply have to come 
to some sort of an arrangement with Turkey, for its own sake if nothing else.   
 Much depends, however, on what sort of security role the EU sees itself, and is 
capable of, taking on in the future. As the third chapter noted, in the absence of clear 
and undisputed leadership of the EU's security project akin to that provided by the US 
in NATO, this becomes a function of how the preferences of different EU member 
states evolve and align. This also makes it particularly difficult to assess the future 
trajectory of the ESDP. However, if the EU does decide to stay the course and 
concentrate on bridging the gap between its lofty foreign and security policy goals and 
its capabilities, as well as on playing a larger role in both regional and global security, 
then the significant nature of the potential Turkish contribution to European security 
will continue to enhance Turkey's candidacy for EU membership. On the other hand, if 
the EU decides to trim back its foreign and security policy goals and not undertake the 
significant political and economic costs associated with playing a global security role, 
then Turkey's potential contribution to the ESDP will no longer be of much use as its 
'trump card' in the accession process and Turkish membership would seem to become 
an ever more distant dream.      
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